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Overview
The over-arching theme of this thesis is the effects of parental background on children and
the effectiveness of policies designed to improve the academic outcomes of socio-
economically disadvantaged students. The first chapter of this thesis explores the causal link
between the education of one generation and that of their children by using IV to account for
the endogeneity of parental education and paternal earnings. The second chapter evaluates the
effectiveness of an intervention designed to improve the academic success at university of
students from socio-economically disadvantaged families. The third and final chapter
examines the potential issues in expanding a programme targeted at financially poorer
students beyond its initial pilot phase.
Chapter One addresses the intergenerational transmission of education and
investigates the extent to which early school leaving (at age 16) may be due to variations in
parental background. An important contribution of the chapter is to distinguish between the
causal effects of parental income and parental education levels. Least squares estimation
reveals conventional results – weak effects of income (when the child is 16), stronger effects
of maternal education than paternal, and stronger effects on sons than daughters. We find that
the education effects remain significant even when household income is included. However,
when we use instrumental variable methods to simultaneously account for the endogeneity of
parental education and paternal income, only maternal education remains significant (for
daughters only) and becomes stronger. These estimates are consistent to various set of
instruments. The impact of paternal income varies between specifications but becomes
insignificant in our preferred specification. Our results provide limited evidence that policies
alleviating income constraints at age 16 can alter schooling decisions but that policies
increasing permanent income would lead to increased participation (especially for daughters).
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Chapter Two is an evaluation of a comprehensive university access programme that
provides financial, academic and social support to low socioeconomic students using a
natural experiment which exploits the time variation in the expansion of the programme
across high schools. Overall, we identity positive treatment effects on retention rates, exam
performance and graduation rates, with the impact often stronger for higher ability students.
Gender differences are also identified. We find similar results for access students entering
through the standard admissions system and those entering with lower grades. This suggests
that access programmes can be effective at improving academic outcomes for socio-
economically disadvantaged students.
In Chapter Three, we compare the effects of the pilot implementation and the
subsequent national roll-out of a large programme, the Educational Maintenance Allowance,
in the UK which provides financial transfers to youth who remain in post-compulsory
education. While piloting policies is becoming standard in policy evaluation, little is known
of their external validity. Using a difference-in-difference-in-differences methodology and
several cohorts of the Youth Cohort Study for England and Wales, we estimate the effect of
the Education Maintenance Allowance on post-compulsory school participation both in the
piloting stage and in its national implementation. We find that the pilot scheme and the
national extension had an effect on post-16 schooling but that the evidence in support of the
national extension is weaker.
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Chapter One: The Impact of Parental
Income and Education on the Schooling
of Children
Co-authors:
Arnaud Chevalier (Royal Holloway, University of London, Geary Institute, University
College Dublin and IZA)
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1.1 Introduction
A considerable literature has focused on the effects of parental background on outcomes of
their children such as cognitive skills, education, health and subsequent income (for a review
see Black and Devereux, 2010). There is little doubt that economic status is positively
correlated across generations. Parents affect the behaviour and decisions taken by their
children through genetic transmission, environment, and preferences. The view that more
educated parents can provide a “better” environment for their children has been the basis of
many interventions.
While the existence of intergenerational correlations is hardly disputed, the nature of
the policy interventions that are suggested depends critically on the characteristics of the
intergenerational transmission mechanism and the extent to which the relationship is causal.
In particular, it has proven difficult to determine whether the transmission mechanism works
through inherited genetic factors or environmental factors and, to the extent that it is the
latter, what is the relative importance of education and income? Moreover, the link between
the schooling of parents and their children could be due to unobserved inherited
characteristics rather than a causal effect of parental education or income per se in household
production. This issue is explored in detail in the review by Bjorklund and Salvanes (2010).
The scientific literature is not entirely clear but it is widely believed that, while raising
the education of both mothers and fathers has broadly similar effects on household income,
the external effects on children associated with parental education are larger for maternal
education than for paternal because mothers tend to be the main provider of care within the
household. For example, a positive relationship between maternal education and their child’s
birth weight, which is a strong predictor of child health, is found not only in the developing
18
world but also in the US (see, for example, Currie and Moretti, 2003). The existence of such
externalities provides an important argument for subsidizing education, especially in
households with low income and/or low educated parents. Indeed there may be multiplier
effects since policy interventions that increase educational attainment for one generation may
create spillovers to later generations.
A neglected issue is to understand the mechanisms by which parental education may
affect children’s outcomes. That is, parental education may be a direct input into the
production function that generates the quality of the endowments that children have in
various domains (health, ability etc.), may affect the choice of other inputs, and may
indirectly facilitate a higher quantity and/or quality of other inputs through its effect on
household income. The use of policy instruments such as income transfers to attempt to break
the cycle of disadvantage presumes this latter route is important. Moreover, once one controls
for education (as a long-run determinant of the level of permanent income), current income is
likely to pick up the effect of income shocks that would matter only in the presence of credit
market constraints.
This chapter addresses an important issue in the existing literature: the causal effect of
parental education on children, allowing for separate effects of maternal and paternal
education; and the causal effect of household income controlling for education. To date no
study has simultaneously tried to account for the endogeneity of both parental education and
parental income. The distinction between education and income is important since differences
in policy approaches hang on their relative effects. Using a British cross-section dataset, we
19
begin by confirming the usual finding using least squares - that parental education levels are
positively associated with good child outcomes, in particular later school leaving.1 This
outcome measure is important because the UK government has targeted a reduction in the
proportion of pupils leaving at 16, and committed itself to a phased increase in the minimum
age at which youths can leave education and training. We go on to use instrumental variable
methods to take account of the endogeneity of both parental income and education. We
exploit a variety of ideas for identification that have been used in other research, including
changes in the minimum school leaving age for the parents, month of birth of the parents
which captures early school tracking that affected the parental cohorts, and parental union
status and its interactions with occupation.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1.2 outlines the existing literature. Section
1.3 explains the nature of the data used. Section 1.4 provides the base estimates, which are
extended and subjected to robustness checks in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 concludes.
1 We also investigate the relative effects of parental education levels and household income on educational
achievement at age 16. High school students in England and Wales usually study up to ten subjects until the age
of 16 which are then examined at the end of compulsory schooling in the school year that they reach 16. These
are scored as A* to F with A* -C being regarded as passing grades. The government’s objective is that 60% of
all 16 year olds pass in at least five subjects. This level of achievement is usually required to progress into senior
high school.
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1.2 Previous Literature
It is widely thought that children brought up in less favourable conditions obtain less
education despite the large financial returns to schooling (Heckman and Masterov, 2004) and
indeed there is a large correlation between the education level of parents and their children
(Bjorklund and Salvanes, 2010). However the transmission mechanism behind such
intergenerational correlations is not clear. Krueger (2004) reviews various contributions
supporting the view that financial constraints significantly impact on educational attainment.
On the contrary, Carneiro and Heckman (2003) suggests that current parental income does
not explain child educational choices, but that family fixed effects that contribute to
permanent income, such as parental education levels, have a much more positive role. This is
the central conclusion of Cameron and Heckman (1998) using US data, and Chevalier and
Lanot (2002) using the UK National Child Development Study data. Chevalier (2004), using
the UK Family Resources Survey cross-section data, finds that including father’s income in
the schooling choice equation of the child, while itself having a significant and positive
effect, does not dramatically change the magnitude of the parental education coefficients.
However, the potential endogeneity of income means that this correlation does not
necessarily imply that parental income matters for children’s human capital accumulation.
Indeed if income is endogenous and is correlated with parental education levels, then the
education coefficients are also biased.
In the literature to date, researchers have attempted to identify the exogenous effect of
either parental education or of parental income, but not both effects simultaneously. The
literature on estimating the causal effect of parental education on the child’s educational
attainment has relied on three identification strategies: instrumental variables, adopted
children, and twins.
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The first identification strategy is to use instrumental variables methods based on
‘natural’ experiments or policy reforms that change the educational distribution of the parents
without directly affecting children. Black et al. (2003) exploit Norwegian educational
reforms which raised the minimum number of years of compulsory schooling over a period of
time and at differential rates between regions of the country. Some parents experienced an
extra year of education compared to other parents who were similar to them in other respects
except birth year. This discontinuity is exploited to identify the effect of parental education
on their children’s education. They find evidence of the impact of parental education in the
OLS estimates of education outcomes for the children but estimates based on IV show no
such effect, with the exception of (weak) evidence of mother/son influences. However,
Oreopoulos et al. (2006) using the same approach and pooling US Census data from 1960,
1970 and 1980 report that an increase in parental education by one year decreases the
probability of a child repeating a schooling year (or grade) by between two and seven
percentage points.
The UK provides similar policy changes which are exploited in Chevalier (2004) and
Galindo-Rueda (2003). Changes in the minimum school leaving age which occurred just
after World War II and again in the early 1970s meant that the educational choices of future
parents was exogenously affected, at least for those wishing to leave school at the earliest
age. Chevalier (2004) finds that for both parents, OLS estimates of the effect of one year of
parental education on the probability of post-compulsory education is about 4%, with the
effects slightly larger for sons than daughters. Using the 1974 change in the school leaving
age legislation as an instrument for parental education, the effects of a parent’s education on
the child of the same gender increased substantially (for a sample of biological parents).
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Galindo-Rueda (2003) exploited the earlier 1947 reform and, relying on regression
discontinuity, find significant causal effects - but only for fathers.
Of course, the minimum school leaving age is likely to affect the bottom of the
schooling distribution more than the top so there is a clear case for thinking, in a
heterogeneous effects model, that such estimates will provide only LATE estimates that are
not strictly comparable to OLS. However, to the extent that policymakers are particularly
concerned about early school leavers such estimates are still of interest. Other instruments,
such as the 1968 rioting of French students (Maurin and McNally, 2008), or exogenous
changes in the cost of education (Carneiro et al, 2007), or the GI bill (Page, 2009) all tend to
support a positive causal effect of parental education on the human capital of children.
An alternative strategy to account for genetic effects is to compare adopted and
natural children. Sacerdote (2007) report that, controlling for ability and assortative mating,
the positive effect of maternal education on children’s education remains. Plug (2004) finds
that paternal education matters more than maternal (which becomes insignificant) when the
two parental effects are included in the adopted sample and that income does not affect these
conclusions. This literature assumes that the presence of adopted children is uncorrelated
with unobservables across families. However adopted and natural children may have
different characteristics, be treated differently in school or by society (especially when of
different race from their parents), or may have incurred some stigma from adoption.
Additionally, adoptive families may provide a different environment to their adopted children
than to their biological children such as more (or less) attention to the adopted child. As
evidence of differences in the environment of adopted and natural children, Maughan et al
(1998) find that adoptees performed more positively than non-adopted children from similar
families on childhood tests of reading, mathematics, and general ability. Bjorklund et al.
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(2006) uses a register of Swedish adoptees, which allows controls for both natural and
adoptive parents’ education. After correcting for the potential bias caused by non-randomness
in this population, they find that genetics account for about 50% of the correlation in
education between generations but also that the causal effect of adoptive parents’ education
remains highly significant.
Finally, Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) use the Minnesota Twins Register female
twin pairs to examine education levels of their children (who are therefore cousins) to
eliminate the effects of “nurture”, and that part of the “nature” effect associated with the
mother (together with some of the effects of father through the associative mating). Based on
simple least squares models using data on just the children and their mothers, they find large
effects: one year of maternal schooling increased children’s years of education by 13%
(approximately half a year) while the effect of paternal schooling was about twice as large.
However the between-cousins estimates of maternal education effects, which therefore
control for the genetic background of the cousins (at least through their mothers) are
negative, albeit insignificantly so. This contradicts the general view that maternal schooling
has a positive effect on the achievement of their children.. In a critical analysis of the
Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) data, Antonovics and Goldberger (2004) show that the
results are quite sensitive to the selection of children who have completed education and who
are aged 18 and over, rather than 16 and over. However, Behrman, Rosenzweig and Zhang
(2004) repeat the original analysis on a large Chinese dataset and find strong support for the
earlier Minnesota analysis.
Holmlund, Lindhal and Plug (2008) investigate whether the disparities in results are
due to differences in the sample used or to the identification strategies. Using Swedish
registered data they can implement the three methods, i.e. twins, adoptees and IV. Their
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results are consistent with the weight of the existing literature. In twin studies, the maternal
effect is small and about half of the paternal education effect. This conclusion is reversed
when using adoptee samples. When relying on IV to estimate the causal effect of parental
education, the paternal effect is never significant but the maternal effect is quite large. They
also find that there are non-linearities in the effect of education with the effect of parental
education being larger at higher levels of education.
Understanding the mechanism through which parental income affects child
educational outcomes can potentially greatly improve our understanding of intergenerational
mobility more generally. For example, there has been much recent debate about whether
intergenerational income mobility in the UK is rising or falling. Blanden, Goodman, Gregg
and Machin (2004) found that income mobility had fallen between the 1958 NCDS and the
1970 BCS. However Goldthorpe and Jackson (2007) find that intergenerational mobility, in
terms of social class rather than income, has not declined when using the same data. However
Blanden, Gregg and MacMillan (2008) reconcile the ostensibly contradictory results of
Blanden and Gregg (2005) and Goldthorpe and Jackson (2007) by showing that the
differences in intergenerational mobility of income are largely within social classes. Knowing
more about the causal mechanisms driving intergenerational transfers would greatly inform
these debates.
The literature on the causal effects of parental earnings or incomes on educational
outcomes is not as extensive as the literature on parental education. Random assignment
experiments are potentially informative but uncommon. Blanden and Gregg (2004) review
US and UK evidence on the effects of policy changes which largely focus on improving
short-term family finances (see also Almond and Currie, 2010). These include initiatives
such as the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiments in the US, which provide financial
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support associated with higher housing costs from moving to more affluent areas. MTO
programmes are associated with noticeable improvements in child behaviour and test scores,
but whether these are caused by the financial gain, changes in the physical environment,
school effects, and/or peer-group changes remains unclear2. Other US work uses welfare-to-
work reforms but again the income changes are accompanied by other behavioural changes –
for example such reforms are aimed at increasing parental labour supply, which may also
affect child attainment3.
Sibling-based studies exploit differential outcomes and incomes but it is far from clear
that parents do not take compensatory actions in the face of differential financial resources
associated with each sibling. If they do, then sibling studies estimate the effects net of those
actions. Other studies look at value added in the form of changes in outcomes associated with
variation in income over time to difference out unobserved heterogeneity. Similar studies use
early measures of outcomes as controls for unobserved heterogeneity. However, estimation of
such lagged dependent variable models are, in general, inconsistent in the presence of fixed
child or family effects. Nor are they really very satisfactory ways of dealing with endogeneity
because income may, itself, respond to lagged outcomes – for example, a failing child may
stimulate a parent to work harder, to provide more financial resources to allow the child to
improve.
2 Work on MTO by Sanbonmatsu et al (2004) suggests that MTO-driven neighbourhood effects on academic
achievement were not significant.
3 In the UK, the pilots of Educational Maintenance Allowances (EMA’s) provided a sizeable means tested cash
benefit conditional on participation in education and paid, depending on pilot scheme, either to the parents or
directly to the child (see Department for Education and Skills, 2002). Enrollments increased by up to 6% in
families eligible for full subsidies. However, this transfer was conditional on staying in school and so this
reform is not directly informative about the effects of unconditional variations in income.
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In the absence of convincing experimental evidence, and because of doubts over the
validity of sibling-based studies, instrumental variables have been used to identify the effect
of parental income effects on child outcomes. Shea (2000) uses union status (and occupation)
as an instrument for parental income. The identifying assumption is that unionized fathers are
not more ‘able’ parents than nonunionized fathers with similar observable skills. Meyer
(1997) uses variation in family income caused by state welfare rules, income sources, and
income before and after the education period of the child, as well as changes in income
inequality. While strong identification assumptions are used in both these studies, they both
find that unanticipated changes in parental long-run income have only modest and sometimes
negligible effects on the human capital of the children4.
Blanden and Gregg (2004), using UK data, find the correlation between family
income and children’s educational attainment has actually risen between the British Cohort
Study of children born in a particular week in 1970 and the later British Household Panel
Survey data which contains children reaching 16 through the 1990’s. They estimate the
causal effect of family income in ordered probit models of child’s educational attainment
(from no qualification up to degree level) based on sibling differences in the panel data.
They also provide estimates of the probability of staying-on at school past the minimum age
of 16. However the paper cannot simultaneously provide estimates of the causal effect of
4 Acemoglu and Pishke (2001) use similar arguments to Meyer (1997) and exploit changes in the family income
distribution between the 1970’s and 1990’s. They find a 10 percent increase in family income is associated with
a 1.4% increase in the probability of attending a four-year college. Loken (2010) studies the long-term effect of
family income on children's educational attainment using the Norwegian oil shock in the 1970s as an
instrument. They find no causal relationship.
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parental education because this is treated as a fixed effect in the sibling difference estimates
and thus differenced out.
Finally, Jenkins and Schluter (2002) is notable for being one of the few studies to
control both for income, at various ages, and education. They study the type of school
attended (vocational or academic), using a small German dataset, they find that later income
is more important than early income, but that income effects are small relative to education
effects. The analysis in their paper, as in Blanden and Gregg (2004), assumes the exogeneity
of income and parental education.
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1.3 Data, Sample Selection and Sources of Exogenous Variation
Research on this topic requires data on two family generations in a single data source – the
education of the children and the education and incomes of their parents. Our analysis is
based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS) - a quarterly survey of households in the U.K. In
each quarter there are roughly 120,000-160,000 respondents (more in earlier quarters) from
the approximately 50,000-65,000 households surveyed. Households are surveyed for five
consecutive quarters. We pool the data from households in the fifth quarter over the period
1993-20065. Children aged 16 to 18 living at home are interviewed in the LFS, and so
parental information can be matched to the child’s record6. Our sub-sample consists of those
children observed in LFS at ages 16 to 18 inclusive (and therefore have made their decision
with respect to post compulsory education participation) which is approximately 43,000
observations, or 4% of all LFS respondents (which corresponds closely to the population
census data).
The key outcome of interest in this chapter is the decision to participate in post-
compulsory schooling, defined as a dummy equal to one if the 16 to 18 year old child is
either in post compulsory education at present or was in education between 16 and 18 but has
left school at the time of interview (based on the age left full time education information in
LFS). Note that only 16 year olds who are surveyed between September and December are
5 Pre-1998, earnings data is available only for fifth wave respondents; from 1998 the earnings data is collected
in the first and in the final wave. Prior to 1993 there was no earnings data in LFS. From 2006 one of our
instrumental variables ceases to be available in the data.
6 Chevalier (2004) uses the Family Resource Survey data that, in many respects, is similar to the LFS data in
this chapter. Crucially, the LFS has information on union status which is potentially important for the
identification strategy adopted in this chapter.
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included to ensure information on their decision to leave or remain in education is available.
The age range is limited because we need to observe respondents while they are still living at
home in order to observe parental background (respondents are not asked directly about their
parents). An examination of BHPS data suggests that only 6% of children aged 16-18 have
already left home. However, this censoring in the LFS data becomes more severe with older
teenagers - whilst 98% of 16-year-old children are observed living with both parents, this
proportion in down to 88% for those 18 years old.7 We also drop observations from Scotland
and Northern Ireland. Although these regions changed their minimum school leaving ages at
different times to England and Wales they also have quite distinct education systems8. The
details of the original LFS data and the impact of the selection criteria can be seen in Table
1.1. We select teenagers where two parents are present9, and where the father is working and
reporting his income, where both parents were born after 1933 (and so were not affected by
the earlier raising of the school leaving from 14 to 15, and whose school leaving is unlikely to
have been directly affected by World War II), and where both parents were born in the
United Kingdom, and are currently resident in England or Wales. We make these restrictions
in order to avoid including potentially endogenous factors that affect educational outcomes.
7 Re-estimating without the 18 year olds showed no economically or statistically significant differences in
results.
8 The data records only region of current residence, not where the parents where educated. However, this is
unimportant in our IV context. Re-estimating including observations in NI and Scotland leads to a drop in
precision but no change in the magnitudes of the key parameters.
9 Whilst this may create some selection bias it would be difficult to overcome this in our data. Since parental
separation is probably more likely for children with large (but unobservable) propensities to leave school early,
and it is also likely to be negatively correlated with parental education and income we might expect to
underestimate the effect of income and education on the dependent variables.
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Thus, our estimates need to be viewed as condition on these selections10. We also drop any
observations where there is missing data on the variables of interest and we trim the bottom
1% and top 5% of the paternal earnings distribution.
Currently only two parent families with the father working as an employee (mother
may or may not be working) are included in the analysis. We do not claim that our results can
be extrapolated to other groups such as single parent families or where the child has already,
by age 16-18, moved away from their parents.
If we were to include all of these other groups then controls for these heterogenous
family groups would need to be included in the second stage equation (i.e. the child outcome
equation). However it is likely that such variables would be endogenous and instruments
would need to be found for each. For example, single mothers may be unobservably different
from married mothers and such differences may be positively or negatively correlated with
child outcomes. Furthermore, including single mothers would also require modelling female
labour supply which would require further instruments.
Figures 1 and 2 show the participation rate in post-compulsory schooling in our final
sample broken down by paternal and maternal education. The education of the children
appears closely correlated with the education of their parents, particularly up to a leaving age
of 18; having parents with more education than this level does not substantially affect the
staying-on probability of children which is then almost 100%11. There are some sizable gaps
10 In fact, the estimated coefficients of interest were not greatly affected by these selections.
11 Note that there are only few parents with school leaving age of 17, 19, 20 and above 23.
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between the participation of girls and boys from lower educated parents but these gaps
narrow with parental education.
Table 1.2 shows some selected statistics for the sample used in our analysis. The post-
compulsory schooling participation rate is 73% for boys and 83% for girls12. There are large
differences in the parental education and household income levels between those that remain
in school compared to those that leave: more than one year extra parental education on
average, and more than 20% higher paternal earnings.
Parental income is potentially endogenous either because it is correlated with
unobservable characteristics which are correlated with the child’s educational attainment, or
because the parental education effect is transmitted through income. Shea (2000) estimates
the impact of parental income using variation in income associated with union, industry, and
job loss and finds a negligible impact on children’s human capital for most families (although
parental income did seem to matter for families whose father has low education). We assume
that union membership status creates an exogenous change in income, which is independent
of parenting ability and the child’s educational choice. Indeed the raw data, presented in
Table 1.2, showed that children who stay on are just as likely to have unionized fathers as
children who do not stay on in education. We also exploit paternal occupation but mostly to
control for differences in unionization rate by occupation. Later, the estimates that we
highlight are those that rely only on paternal occupation-union interactions as exclusion
12 Official statistics from the Department for Children, Schools and Families show 67% of boys and 75% of
girls in the relevant cohort choosing to stay so our own staying-on figures from LFS are a little higher reflecting
the selections that we have made.
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restrictions, (although we find a similar pattern of results when we also use union status alone
as the exclusion restriction).
Lewis (1986), and much subsequent work, demonstrates that wages vary substantially
with union status, controlling for observable skills. Figure 1.5 shows the kernel densities of
the earnings of union member fathers and non-union fathers. The union/non-union earnings
gap for fathers in our selected sample from the raw data is 8%. If union wage premia reflect
rents rather than unobserved ability differences it seems plausible to make the (stronger)
identifying assumption, used in this chapter; that union status, controlling for occupation, is
uncorrelated directly with the parental influence on educational outcomes of the children.
Support for the view that unionization picks up differences in labour market productivity is
mixed. Murphy and Topel (1990) find that individuals who switch union status experience
wage changes that are small relative to the corresponding cross-section wage differences,
suggesting that union premia are primarily due to differences in unobserved ability. However
Freeman (1994) counters this view, arguing that union switches in panel data are largely
spurious so that measurement error biases the union coefficient towards zero in the panel. In
any event, we are assuming, as in Shea (2002), that unionized fathers (and their spouses) are
not more ‘productive’ as parents than non-union fathers with similar observable skills and we
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have some evidence to suggest that parenting behaviour is not very different across union
status of fathers.13
Parental education is also likely to be endogenous. Here we rely on two sources of
variation. Reforms to the minimum school leaving age have frequently been used as a source
of exogenous variation – either exploiting natural experiments where different areas of a
country changed their rules at different times, or using a national reform as a regression
discontinuity by controlling for the smooth trends in school leaving, or considering just a
narrow window of birth cohorts around the reform.14 In this chapter we identify the effect of
parental education on children’s education using the exogenous variation in schooling caused
by the raising of the minimum school leaving age (abbreviated as RoSLA: Raising of the
School Leaving Age). Individuals born before September 1957 could leave school at 15
while those born after this date had to stay for an extra year of schooling. This policy change
creates a discontinuity in the years of education attained by the parents. Figures 1.3 and 1.4
illustrate this by showing mean years of schooling by birth cohort (in 4 month periods)
around the reform date. That is, we take a narrow window of birth cohorts around the reform
13 The British Cohort Study (BCS) data, of all children born in England and Wales in a particular week in 1970,
records, in considerable detail, the attitudes and behaviours of fathers towards their children. This data suggests
small differences in attitudes and behaviours across union status. For example, 23% on unionised fathers
disagreed with the statement that “The needs of children are more important than one’s own”, compared to 18%
of the non-unionised; 60% (62%) of children with unionised (non-unionised) fathers watched TV less than 2
hours per day on a typical weekend day; 83% (88%) of unionised (non-unionised) fathers read stories more than
once per week 57% (52%) of unionised (non-unionised) fathers always (as opposed to often/sometimes/never)
talked to his child even when busy; 79% (79%) of unionised (non-unionised) fathers showed the child physical
affection at least once per day and 36% (37%) praised the child at least once per day; 94% (95%) of unionised
(non-unionised) fathers has helped young children learn numbers, etc; and 79% (80%) of unionised (non-
unionised) fathers aspired for the child to continue in full-time education at age 16. The children also reported
behaviour that might well reflect parenting styles. For example, 56% (54%) of the children of unionised (non-
unionised) fathers made their own bed and 49% (52%) cleaned their own room.
14 See, for example, Harmon and Walker (1995) for the UK; Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005) for Norway;
and Oreopoulos, Page and Stevens, (2006) for the USA.
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(+/- four years) to minimize the influence of any long-term trends across birth cohorts. There
is a marked jump in the graph for parents born after September 1957 which coincides with
the introduction of the new higher school leaving age. Note that between 30% and 40% of
parents left school before the new minimum, so that the reform is biting and changes the
behaviour of a substantial fraction of individuals in the affected cohorts. Individuals affected
by the new school leaving age have on average completed half a year more schooling than
those born just before the reform. Chevalier et al. (2004) show that the effect of this reform
was almost entirely confined to the probability of leaving at 15 relative to 16 – there is little
effect higher up the years of education distribution. Hence, this reform only identifies a
LATE for individuals with low levels of education. Table 1.2 shows that the proportion of
fathers who were born before the RoSLA reform is higher than for mothers, reflecting their
slightly greater age, and the table also shows that early leavers typically have slightly
younger parents.
A second source of variation in parental schooling that we exploit derives from
parental month of birth (exploited by Crawford et al. (2007)). There are several ways in
which month of birth can affect the parents’ education levels: through entry timing, whole
group teaching, developmental differences, and through peer effects. The academic year
starts in September but the traditional admissions policy that reigned in the 1950’s and
1960’s, when most of the parents in our data were young, allowed entry at the start of the
term that the child turns 5 so that there were three points of entry each year: September,
January and April/May. Thus the August born would start in April/May and have two fewer
terms in primary school than their classmates. A school cohort would consist of children born
within a 12-month window. In the 1950’s and 60’s whole class teaching was the dominant
teaching method and development differences might imply that the youngest and the oldest
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might fare worse than the average. Peer effects might arise because the youngest might be
dominated or intimidated by the oldest. The year group moves as a single unit through the
academic system so that they sit examinations at same time and would be at different
development ages when facing the same examination.
Moreover, most of the parents in the data would have faced a selective schooling
system where children were segregated into academic or vocational schools at the age of 11
based on a single test conducted on the same day across the whole country - known as the
11+ exam. Based on the results of this test, children were educated either in vocational or
academic tracks. Children in the vocational track were more likely to leave school at the
minimum compulsory age, while those for the latter could go on to higher secondary school
and university (see Harmon and Walker, 1995). These two different types of schools placed
quite different expectations on the children and there was very little movement between
school types after the age of 11. Figure 1.6 shows, by year of birth, the average age at which
the parents in our data left full-time education for those who were September born, the eldest
in their class cohort, compared to those who were July born, the youngest15. The typical
difference in years of schooling between the September and July born was around ¼ of a year
for these cohorts born in the 50’s and 60’s. Notice that the gap closed completely for cohorts
born in the early 1960’s when the 11+ examination was abandoned in most areas. So the
month of birth effect in educational achievement seems to be mostly driven by the early
tracking faced by these cohorts.
15 We use July rather than August for this comparison since there is likely to be some ambiguity with August-
born children to the extent that schools exercised discretion at the margin.
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1.4 Estimates
Our basic model of the impact of parental background on the post-compulsory schooling
participation of their children is:
(1)  , ( , , )     c m f h h c m f cPC a S S Y f DB DB DBX δ
where the c, m and f subscripts refer to the child, mother’s and father’s characteristics within
a particular household h. The dependent variable PCc is a dummy variable defining
participation in post compulsory education. This is estimated as a linear probability model to
subsequently facilitate the use of instrumental variables, and is a function, a(.), of parental
education levels measured in years of schooling of both the mother and father (Sm , Sf), and
log parental income Yh measured by father’s real log gross weekly earnings from
employment16. DB refers to date of birth (year and month) so that f(.) controls for cohort
trends in paternal, maternal and child education. Three different specifications of X are used.
First Xh contains characteristics common to all three members of the family (i.e. year and
month of survey dummies as well as region of residence at time of survey as well as
interactions to capture region-time time effects such as local unemployment rates which may
affect staying on rates). Second, we additionally condition for paternal occupation, so that
the difference in unionization between occupations does not identify the IV model. Third, we
16 Note that we use paternal income because the use of household income measures requires the inclusion of
female earnings, which is potentially much more heavily affected by endogenous labour supply decisions.
However its exclusion may also cause a bias if female labour supply is correlated with educational outcomes for
children as well as with the variable of interest in the model. We share our inability to resolve this problem with
the rest of the literature. If maternal labour supply is uncorrelated with paternal income and if incomes are
shared within the household then our estimate of the effect of paternal income is the same as the effect of
household income. This is clearly an important problem for future research.
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add union status, so that the identification in the IV model only comes from the interaction
terms between union status and occupation. This then captures any differences in parenting
behaviour that unionized father may have.
It is difficult to include female labour supply in the model. A priori, one might think that
female labour supply would affect child outcomes (although probably more so at younger
ages than at the ages of people choosing post-compulsory schooling). However one could
argue that the female employment decision is endogenous when modelling child outcomes.
For example, female labour supply is dependent on, among other things, reservation wages
and wage offers. These may be affected by factors which remain unobserved even after
controlling for maternal education. Such factors might include preferences for work over
staying at home and non-cognitive character traits. These in turn may affect child outcomes
directly and thus there would be an endogeneity problem which would require finding
another instrument in addition to those already used in the model.
The main focus of this paper is to overcome, jointly, the endogeneity problems associated
with paternal education, maternal education and paternal income. Incorporating female
labour supply into the model is an important issue and one that would need future
investigation, perhaps with a different dataset that would allow the researcher to observe
female employment at different ages of the child and child outcomes and where possible
instrumental variables (e.g. presence of younger siblings, more detailed local labour market
information, etc) are available.
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Table 1.3 summarizes our OLS estimates of paternal income and parental education
levels, where a(.) is assumed to be linear, on the probability of post-compulsory schooling of
the child17. Specification (1) only controls for parental years of schooling and suggests
positive, if modest, paternal and maternal education effects on the schooling choice of both
sexes. The impact of a year of maternal education is an increase in the probability of post-16
participation of about 3.3% for boys and 2.6% for girls – about one percentage point lower
than reported in Chevalier (2004). The impact of paternal education is somewhat lower and
the effect on boys is larger than for girls. Specification (2) examines the impact of paternal
income but excludes the parental education controls. These estimates suggest sizable and
significant income elasticities with the effect somewhat larger for boys (20%) than for girls
(14%). Finally specification (3) includes both education and income controls. The direct
effects of maternal education estimated in Specification (1) are reduced very slightly in (3),
but the paternal education and income effects are reduced by a factor of approximately one
third compared to (1) and (2), highlighting the correlation between paternal education and
income18
The second set of estimates (4, 5, 6) in Table 1.3 adds the paternal occupation status
(7 dummies). This is potentially an endogenous variable, but since unionization rate differs
by occupation, without controlling for occupation the union instrument would partially
17 We control for smooth cohort trends by including a cubic function of parents and child’s months/years of
birth. Region controls are also included, as well as survey year dummies. Similar estimates based on probit
models are also available. While multiple observations of closely spaced children in each household are possible
their incidence is small (just 10% of individuals have at least one other sibling in the dataset) and any
improvement in standard errors from exploiting the clustering in the data would be marginal.
18 The estimated income effects here are closely comparable in magnitude to the results in Blanden and Gregg
(2004). See their Tables 6 and 7 in particular.
39
capture occupational choice which would invalidate its use. As expected, since parental
occupation can be viewed as proxies for permanent income, the estimates on education are
almost identical to those obtained when controlling for paternal income. Thus, in this
specification, income is best interpreted as deviation from the permanent income. As such,
the income effects are reduced by about 30% for boys and 50% for girls. Note, however, that
when controlling for occupation, adding paternal income only marginally reduces the effect
of paternal education on the educational attainment of children. Thus indicating that the
correlation between paternal education and income mostly captures the permanent component
of income, rather than income shocks.
While we have tried to alleviate the concern that unionized fathers differ in their
parenting behaviour, our final identification strategy relies only on the interactions of
paternal union membership and paternal occupation as instruments for paternal income.
Thus, the final set of estimates in Table 1.3 show the effects of parental education and
paternal earnings when controlling for the effects (not interacted) of paternal union
membership and paternal occupation dummies in specifications (7), (8) and (9). The effects
of parental education are virtually unchanged compared to the estimates presented in (4) and
(6); supporting the view that paternal union membership has no direct effect on the education
decision of his children. For girls, the effect of paternal income also remains unchanged
compared to specifications (5) and (6) while for boys it decreases by less than one percentage
point. To summarise these results: the effect of parental education on the decision to remain
in school past compulsory age appears to be quite small - around 3% for boys and 2% for
girls, and larger for maternal education than parental education. The gap between the effect of
maternal and paternal education increases when measures of, or proxies for, income are
introduced since the maternal education effect remains largely unaffected while paternal
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education effect drops by almost a half. Note also that the income effects are severely
reduced when a measure of permanent income is controlled for.
To control for the potential endogeneity of paternal income and parental schooling we
specify a set of first stage equations. We define dummy variables for RoSLA (born after the
critical date) and parental union membership (PUM), and its interactions with the seven
occupational categories, Occ, which are incorporated into our first stage model. We also
impose a linear structure on the month of birth effect19 by including a month of birth
indicator, MoB (which takes the value of one for September born through to twelve for
August born). Therefore, in our preferred specification, we estimate a system of first stage
equations, using a seemingly unrelated specification to allow for correlations between the
respective residuals:
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where the functions r(.), and s(.) control for smooth birth cohort trends in school leaving age
so that the RoSLA acts as a regression discontinuity and picks up the effects of the reform.
The system of equations defined above is over-identified and we estimated a wide
variety of first stages and corresponding second stage equations to examine the sensitivity of
the second stage estimates to the set of exclusion restrictions used to define the instrumental
variables. Our IV estimates have the property, also a feature of the OLS estimates, that the
19 Greater flexibility could be sought but at the cost, of course, of potential weakness in the instruments.
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addition of income to the model containing just parental education levels makes little
difference to the estimates. Thus, we refrain from presenting specifications that contain just
parental income or just parental education levels. Table 1.4 shows different specifications of
our three first stage equations. Each block refers to a different equation – the paternal
schooling equation, the maternal schooling equation, and the paternal log earnings equation.
The columns show specifications that vary according to which sets of instruments are used.
The three equations are estimated simultaneously and the F-statistics of the different sets of
instruments are presented in the bottom panel of the table. Comparing across the schooling
equations we see that the inclusion of MoB is significant at 5% but makes little difference to
the size and significance of the RoSLA effects. In general, the raising of the school leaving
age increased parental education by between 0.25 and 0.3 of a year, the effects being almost
identical for both parents. The month of birth effect is also statistically significant and
negative for both males and females. An August born child, on average, left school one sixth
of a year earlier than a September born child. The two instruments identify the effects of
exogenous shocks to parental education through different mechanisms - so that in models
where both set of instruments are included the estimates are almost identical to the ones
obtained when the instruments are included individually. So while both instruments identify
a population of marginal students, these are not identical populations. The paternal earnings
equation shows a significant positive union membership wage premium of 7% in columns 1,
2 and 3, which are consistent with existing UK evidence. In specifications 4, 5 and 6 the
interactions of union membership and occupation show that the premium is larger for manual
and less skilled occupations (the reference group being Managers and Senior Administrators).
The corresponding F tests for the joint significance of all of the instruments used in each
specification of the exclusion restrictions indicate whether the instruments are “weak”. The
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critical values of these F tests are reported in Stock and Yogo (2005) – the rule of thumb for
the just identified case and one endogenous variable is approximately 10, with larger values
for more exclusion restrictions. Thus our F tests vary from indicating instruments with
considerable strength to being close to weak.
Table 1.5 shows the second stage estimates20. Specifications (a) and (b) replicate the
OLS estimates from Table 1.3 when controlling for occupation only or for occupation and
union status, respectively. The subsequent columns report the IV estimates for different
specifications of the first stage. The pattern of second stage estimates of parental education
effects seems remarkably stable across the IV specifications. The effect of paternal education
is always imprecisely estimated when controlling for maternal education and paternal
earnings regardless of which set of instruments is used and never statistically significant.
Note though that the sign of the point estimates differs for sons and daughters. The effect of
maternal education on daughters is between 0.187 and 0.212 depending on the instruments
used and is always significant at the 1% level, and significantly higher than the OLS estimate
of 0.022. The magnitude of the effect of maternal schooling on the schooling of sons also
increases greatly when instrumented and reaches 0.10 in all specifications but just failed to be
statistically significant. Overall, the impact of maternal schooling on the schooling decisions
of her children, and especially daughters, appear to be quite large.
The effect of paternal earnings varies with the instruments used. When Paternal Union
Membership alone is used as an instrument, the effect is roughly 0.26 for sons and 0.29 for
20 Table 1.5 reports only the OLS and IV estimates for the specifications labelled (6) and (9) in Table 1.3 but
similar stability in the second stage results can be shown in the estimates for the equivalent of the other
specifications presented in Table 1.3.
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daughters. If occupation, union membership and interactions of occupation and union
membership are used, the effect of paternal income becomes larger for sons (0.32) but
decreases (to 0.13) for daughters. However, in our preferred specification, when only the
interactions of union and occupation are used as instrument and both union and occupations
are controlled for, the effect of paternal income becomes much smaller especially for
daughters. Even if the point estimates are still large for sons, they are statistically
insignificant at even the 10% level. Thus, paternal earnings, that we take as a measure of
short term variation in the household income as we are controlling for occupation, have little
impact on the schooling decisions of children.
Measurement Error
In our specifications we control for paternal employee earnings as reported at the time the
young person is 16, 17 or 18. Blanden, Gregg and MacMillan (2008) discuss the problem of
measurement error in relation to income. Like all non-systematic measurement errors, this
will bias the coefficient downwards if the variable is included as a regressor. They have
concerns that income is more likely to be mis-measured for those with less attachment to the
labour market. These families might be relying on non-labour market sources of income
which may not be well measured. In our study we are not looking at income in general but at
paternal employee earnings specifically. We are not claiming that our results can be
extrapolated to families relying on paternal self-employment income or solely on welfare or
another source of income.
Blanden, Gregg and MacMillan (2008) also discuss the problem of measurement error
in relation to the distinction between current and transitory income. They recognise that
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income over the child’s entire life, especially at the early stages (see Carnerio and Heckman
(2003)), would have a greater influence on child outcomes at 16 then income recorded at 16.
Using a variety of data sources, they argue that father’s social class is not as good as a
predictor of permanent income as education, housing tenure type and receipt of free school
meals.
In the LFS data used in this study, it is not possible to construct a measure of
permanent income as LFS is a rotating panel with addresses staying in the panel for only five
quarters. However our main specifications control for both parental education and paternal
social class which will proxy the effect of permanent income. Indeed the effect of paternal
employment income falls significantly when paternal social class is included in the model.
Thus our measure of current income could be seen as transitory deviations from lifecycle
profiles of income.
Grade Attainment:
The models were also estimated using whether the child attains +5 GCSE A*-C grades as the
outcome of interest. Attaining +5 GSCE A*-C grades is often a requirement for admission to
a sixth form to take A levels. The results are shown in Tables 1A1, 1A2, 1A3 & 1A4 in the
appendix. Both the OLS and IV estimates are shown. The OLS estimates are very similar to
those where the outcome is whether or not the child stays in full tome education beyond the
age of 16. In the IV estimates, we find that the effect of income on grade attainment is the
same or smaller as the effect of income on staying on in post-compulsory schooling.
However this varies by the instruments used. In the case where only the interactions of
paternal union status and paternal socioeconomic group are used as instruments for income,
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no significant effect of income is found. In the IV results for girls, no effect of maternal
education on grade attainment is found.
As fewer respondents answered the questions relating to grade attainment than did so
in relation to staying on in post compulsory education, the sample sizes are smaller by about
15%. To check if sample selection could explain the differences in the pattern of results
between the two outcomes, the “staying on” model was estimated using the sample who had
answered the grade attainment question. The overall pattern of results using this smaller
sample are similar but the effect of income is less precisely estimated. These results are
included in the appendix.
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1.5 Conclusion
This chapter has addressed the intergenerational transmission of education and investigated
the extent to which early school leaving (at age 16) may be due to variations in permanent
income and parental education levels. Least squares revealed conventional results - stronger
effects of maternal than paternal education, and stronger effects on sons than daughters. We
also found that the education effects remained significant even when household income was
included. Income remains significant even when some measures of permanent income are
included which indicates that some children could be financially constrained in their decision
to attend post-compulsory education.
When controlling for paternal income, the IV results reinforce the role of maternal
education, especially for daughters, where the estimates increase almost ten fold. One year of
maternal education, for mothers affected by our instruments, increases the probability of her
daughter staying on by 20 percentage points. The effects on sons are only half of this and just
on the border of statistical significance. In contrast, paternal education has no statistical
effect on the probability of remaining in educations for either son or daughter.
Accounting for the endogeneity of paternal income also increases the elasticity of
income on schooling decisions, however depending on the set of instruments the effects is
imprecisely estimated, and in our preferred specification becomes insignificant, even if a
large point estimate is still found for sons. The income effects are in general larger for boys
than for girls, this is also the case for the UK’s Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA).
The results imply that policy options that are explicitly aimed at relieving credit
constraints at the minimum school leaving age such as EMA (see Dearden et al., 2009) may
not be so effective in promoting higher levels of education (a finding that is consistent with
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recent UK evidence that used linked administrative data for a cohort from age 11 to age 19 –
see Chowdry et al, 2010). A policy of increasing permanent income, like increasing parental
education (or say through Child Benefit) would on the other hand have some positive effects,
especially for daughters. The recently proposed increase of the school leaving age to 18
would also benefit future generations through direct intergenerational transmission of
educational choice.
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Figure 1. 3 Distribution of Paternal School Leaving Age by Third of Year of Birth
Figure 1. 4 Distribution of Maternal School Leaving Age by Third of Year of Birth
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Figure 1. 5 Distribution of Father’s Weekly Earnings by Union Status
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Figure 1. 6 Average School Leaving Age by Year of Birth: England Only
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Tables for Chapter One
Table 1.1 Sample Selection
Living Away
from parents
Living with
one parent
Living with
both parents
Final
sample
Age distribution:
% aged 16 1.99 10.06 10.89 10.29
% aged 17 33.82 47.45 48.94 46.87
% aged 18 64.19 42.49 40.17 42.84
% Staying on at 16 26.99 71.06 75.85 77.53
% Attaining 5+ GCSE
A*-C 39.68 67.16 76.54 78.07
Observations: 2,836 9,035 31,103 8,367
Note: The following are dropped from the penultimate column to form the final sample:
families where father is not working or self employed or has no or missing reported earnings
(approximately nine thousand); families where one or both parents are immigrants
(approximately five thousand); very old or very young parents (approximately four hundred);
families residing in Scotland and in heavily oversampled Northern Ireland (approximately
five thousand); observations missing other information (approximately fourteen hundred);
and the bottom 1% and top 5% of the father’s earnings distribution (approximately seven
hundred).
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Table 1.2 Descriptive Statistics LFS 1992-2006 Estimation Sample
Paternal
Log
Earnings
Paternal
School
Leaving
Age
Maternal
School
Leaving
Age
Paternal
Age
Maternal
Age
Father
affected
by
RoSLA
Mother
Affected
by RoSLA
Paternal
Union
Membershi
p
Age of
Respondent
Girls: N= 4024
Did not stay in full time education (17%): 6.04 15.93 15.93 45.41 43.52 0.31 0.23 0.41 17.32
(0.43) (1.48) (1.25) (5.51) (4.84) (0.46) (0.42) (0.49) (0.65)
Did stay in full time education (83%): 6.31 17.28 17.17 47.09 45.03 0.26 0.18 0.43 17.32
(0.50) (2.61) (2.23) (5.08) (4.49) (0.44) (0.38) (0.50) (0.65)
All 6.27 17.04 16.95 46.80 44.77 0.27 0.19 0.43 17.32
(0.50) (2.50) (2.15) (5.19) (4.59) (0.44) (0.39) (0.50) (0.65)
Boys: N= 4343
Did not stay in full time education (27%) 6.07 15.97 16.00 45.36 43.31 0.34 0.23 0.40 17.35
(0.45) (1.45) (1.25) (5.04) (4.62) (0.47) (0.42) (0.49) (0.64)
Did stay in full time education (73%) 6.33 17.49 17.33 47.05 45.10 0.24 0.16 0.43 17.32
(0.50) (2.73) (2.32) (4.97) (4.52) (0.43) (0.36) (0.49) (0.66)
All 6.26 17.08 16.97 46.60 44.62 0.27 0.18 0.42 17.33
(0.50) (2.55) (2.17) (5.05) (4.62) (0.44) (0.38) (0.49) (0.65)
Note: Selected means, standard deviation in brackets
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Table 1.3 Effects of Parental Education and Income on the Probability of Post-Compulsory Schooling of Children
Specification: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
BOYS: N=4343
Maternal School Leaving Age 0.033 0.030 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.028
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Paternal School Leaving Age
0.024 0.017 0.014 0.012 0.014 0.012
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Paternal Log Earnings
0.192 0.120 0.111 0.083 0.103 0.076
0.015 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017
GIRLS: N= 4024
Maternal School Leaving Age
0.025 0.024 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.021
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Paternal School Leaving Age
0.015 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Paternal Log Earnings
0.136 0.093 0.064 0.047 0.061 0.045
0.013 0.014 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016
Controls for paternal union membership No no no no no No Yes Yes Yes
60
Control for paternal occupation No no no yes yes Yes Yes yes yes
Note: LFS 1992-2006. Standard errors in italics. Specifications 1, 2 and 3 include year of survey dummies, regional dummies,
interactions of year of survey and region, dummies of child’s date of birth, dummies in the date of birth of both parents in five year
intervals.
61
Table 1.4 First Stage Regressions
N=8,367 1 2 3 4 5 6
Paternal RoSLA 0.270 0.250 0.278 0.258
0.098 0.099 0.102 0.102
Paternal MoB -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 -0.013
Pa
te
rn
al
Sc
ho
ol
in
g
0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007
Maternal RoSLA 0.278 0.255 0.284 0.261
0.08 0.08 0.08 0.081
Maternal MoB -0.016 -0.014 -0.016 -0.014
M
at
er
na
l
sc
ho
ol
in
g
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
Paternal Union Membership (PUM) 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.049 0.049 0.049
0.009 0.009 0.009 0.018 0.018 0.018
PUM *Professional 0.009 0.009 0.009
0.027 0.027 0.027
PUM*Lower Professional 0.005 0.004 0.004
0.032 0.032 0.032
PUM*Admin & Secretarial 0.102 0.102 0.102
0.043 0.043 0.043
PUM*Skilled Trade 0.106 0.106 0.106
0.027 0.027 0.027
PUM*Personal Services 0.304 0.304 0.304
0.042 0.042 0.042
PUM*Machine Operatives 0.117 0.117 0.117
0.028 0.028 0.028
PUM*Elementary Occupations 0.208 0.208 0.208
Pa
te
rn
al
ea
rn
in
gs
0.039 0.039 0.039
RoSLA 8.88, 0 7.44, 0 9.00, 0 7.58, 0
MoB 6.57, 0 5.13, 0.01 6.21, 0 4.79, 0.01
RoSLA and MoB 7.01, 0 6.90, 0
Occ 290.14, 0 290.14 290.14, 0
PUM 59.82, 0 59.82, 0 59.82, 0 7.28, 0.01 7.28, 0.01 7.28, 0.01
PUM, Occ., PUM*Occ. 187.39,0 187.39,0 187.44, 0
PUM*Occ. 13.34, 0 13.34, 0 13.34, 0
PUM, PUM*Occ 37.24, 0 37.24, 0 37.24, 0
Parental Education IVs, PUM 25.8,0 24.25, 0 17.54, 0 8.43, 0 6.56, 0 6.98, 0
Parental Education IVs, PUM, Occ,
PUM*Occ
166.47,0 166.1, 0 149.46, 0
Parental Education IVs, PUM*Occ 12.38, 0 11.77, 0 11.00, 0
Parental Education IVs, PUM, PUM*Occ 31.58 31.021 27.11,0
F
st
at
s,
p
va
lu
es
Note: Standard errors in italic. The models also include year of survey dummies, regional dummies, dummies of
child’s date of birth, dummies in the date of birth of both parents in five year intervals and dummies for paternal
occupation. RoSLA is a dummy for the Raising of School Leaving Age, MoB stands for Month of birth (a linear
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function on month with September = 1 to August = 12); PUM is Paternal Union Membership Status; and Occ is
paternal occupation (7 categories)
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Table 1.5 Instrumental Variable Estimates: LFS 1992-2006
Specification: A B 1 2 3 4 5 6
Instruments - RoSLA RoSLA RoSLA RoSLA RoSLA RoSLA
Mob MoB MoB
PUM PUM PUM PUM
PUM*Occ PUM*Occ PUM*Occ PUM*Occ
Second stage controls PUM PUM PUM
Occ Occ Occ Occ Occ Occ Occ Occ
BOYS: N=4343
Maternal School Leaving Age
0.028 0.028 0.078 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079
0.004 0.004 0.061 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060
Paternal School Leaving Age
0.012 0.012 0.031 0.023 0.033 0.025 0.039 0.030
0.003 0.003 0.047 0.045 0.046 0.044 0.047 0.045
Paternal Log Earnings
0.083 0.076 0.268 0.273 0.338 0.340 0.259 0.266
0.017 0.017 0.094 0.094 0.080 0.080 0.144 0.144
GIRLS: N=4024
Maternal School Leaving Age
0.022 0.021 0.211 0.184 0.209 0.183 0.208 0.182
0.003 0.003 0.057 0.055 0.057 0.055 0.057 0.055
Paternal School Leaving Age
0.006 0.006 -0.096 -0.062 -0.075 -0.044 -0.068 -0.037
0.003 0.003 0.045 0.041 0.044 0.041 0.045 0.041
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Paternal Log Earnings
0.047 0.045 0.233 0.220 0.104 0.095 0.016 0.003
0.016 0.016 0.082 0.082 0.072 0.072 0.095 0.094
Notes: Standard errors in italics. All second stage specifications include year of survey dummies, regional dummies, interactions of year of survey and region, dummies of
child’s date of birth, and dummies in the date of birth of both parents in five year intervals. RoSLA is a dummy for the Raising of School Leaving Age, Mob stands for Month of
birth (linear), PUM for Paternal Union Status, and Occ for Paternal occupation (7 categories)
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Appendix for Chapter One
Table 1A1 Effects of Parental Education and Income on the Probability of their Children Attaining +5 A*-C GCSE grades
Specification: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
BOYS: N=3523
Maternal School Leaving Age 0.030 0.029 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Paternal School Leaving Age
0.018 0.014 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.008
0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Paternal Log Earnings
0.148 0.083 0.076 0.051 0.071 0.047
0.017 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019
GIRLS: N= 3523
Maternal School Leaving Age
0.026 0.024 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Paternal School Leaving Age
0.018 0.012 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.008
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Paternal Log Earnings
0.154 0.103 0.086 0.066 0.083 0.064
0.015 0.016 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018
Controls for paternal union membership No no no no No No Yes Yes Yes
Control for paternal occupation No no no yes yes Yes Yes yes Yes
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Note: LFS 1992-2006. Standard errors in italics. Specifications 1, 2 and 3 include year of survey dummies, regional dummies,
interactions of year of survey and region, dummies of child’s date of birth, dummies in the date of birth of both parents in five year
intervals.
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Table 1A2 Instrumental Variable Estimates: Effects of Parental Education and Income on the Probability of their Children Attaining +5 A*-C
GCSE grades
Specification: A B 1 2 3 4 5 6
Instruments - RoSLA RoSLA RoSLA RoSLA RoSLA RoSLA
Mob MoB MoB
PUM PUM PUM PUM
PUM*Occ PUM*Occ PUM*Occ PUM*Occ
Second stage controls PUM PUM PUM
Occ Occ Occ Occ Occ Occ Occ Occ
BOYS: N=4343
Maternal School Leaving Age
0.027 0.027 0.094 0.105 0.094 0.105 0.094 0.106
0.004 0.004 0.058 0.057 0.058 0.057 0.058 0.057
Paternal School Leaving Age
0.008 0.008 0.072 0.034 0.070 0.033 0.088 0.049
0.004 0.004 0.048 0.045 0.047 0.044 0.048 0.045
Paternal Log Earnings
0.051 0.047 0.126 0.154 0.191 0.208 -0.021 0.023
0.019 0.019 0.109 0.108 0.099 0.099 0.166 0.165
GIRLS: N=4024
Maternal School Leaving Age
0.022 0.022 -0.013 -0.010 -0.015 -0.011 -0.016 -0.012
0.004 0.004 0.059 0.058 0.059 0.058 0.059 0.058
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Paternal School Leaving Age
0.008 0.008 0.014 0.001 0.034 0.017 0.039 0.021
0.003 0.003 0.053 0.045 0.052 0.045 0.052 0.045
Paternal Log Earnings
0.066 0.064 0.251 0.258 0.138 0.144 0.079 0.087
0.018 0.018 0.096 0.095 0.084 0.084 0.110 0.109
Notes: Standard errors in italics. All second stage specifications include year of survey dummies, regional dummies, interactions of year of survey and region, dummies of
child’s date of birth, and dummies in the date of birth of both parents in five year intervals. RoSLA is a dummy for the Raising of School Leaving Age, Mob stands for Month of
birth (linear), PUM for Paternal Union Status, and Occ for Paternal occupation (7 categories)
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Table 1A3 Effects of Parental Education and Income on the Probability of their Children Staying On (using same sample as those reporting
GCSE results)
Specification: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
BOYS: N=3523
Maternal School Leaving Age 0.023 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.019
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Paternal School Leaving Age
0.019 0.015 0.012 0.010 0.011 0.010
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Paternal Log Earnings
0.133 0.075 0.068 0.045 0.064 0.042
0.015 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.018
GIRLS: N= 3523
Maternal School Leaving Age
0.020 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Paternal School Leaving Age
0.011 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Paternal Log Earnings
0.103 0.067 0.046 0.032 0.043 0.030
0.013 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.016
Controls for paternal union membership No no No no No No Yes Yes Yes
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Control for paternal occupation no no No yes yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: LFS 1992-2006. Standard errors in italics. Specifications 1, 2 and 3 include year of survey dummies, regional dummies,
interactions of year of survey and region, dummies of child’s date of birth, dummies in the date of birth of both parents in five year
intervals.
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Table 1A4 Instrumental Variable Estimates: Effects of Parental Education and Income on the Probability of their Children Staying On (using
same sample as those reporting GCSE results)
Specification: A B 1 2 3 4 5 6
Instruments - RoSLA RoSLA RoSLA RoSLA RoSLA RoSLA
Mob MoB MoB
PUM PUM PUM PUM
PUM*Occ PUM*Occ PUM*Occ PUM*Occ
Second stage controls PUM PUM PUM
Occ Occ Occ Occ Occ Occ Occ Occ
BOYS: N=3523
Maternal School Leaving Age
0.020 0.019 0.068 0.067 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068
0.004 0.004 0.054 0.052 0.053 0.052 0.054 0.052
Paternal School Leaving Age
0.010 0.010 0.058 0.049 0.053 0.045 0.059 0.049
0.003 0.003 0.044 0.042 0.043 0.041 0.045 0.042
Paternal Log Earnings
0.045 0.042 0.119 0.126 0.206 0.211 0.148 0.158
0.018 0.018 0.100 0.100 0.092 0.091 0.153 0.152
GIRLS: N=3525
Maternal School Leaving Age
0.017 0.017 0.209 0.194 0.207 0.193 0.205 0.192
0.003 0.003 0.051 0.050 0.051 0.050 0.051 0.050
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Paternal School Leaving Age
0.005 0.005 -0.102 -0.061 -0.083 -0.047 -0.078 -0.043
0.003 0.003 0.046 0.039 0.045 0.039 0.045 0.039
Paternal Log Earnings
0.032 0.030 0.208 0.189 0.089 0.078 0.034 0.019
0.016 0.016 0.083 0.083 0.073 0.073 0.095 0.095
Notes: Standard errors in italics. All second stage specifications include year of survey dummies, regional dummies, interactions of year of survey and region, dummies of
child’s date of birth, and dummies in the date of birth of both parents in five year intervals. RoSLA is a dummy for the Raising of School Leaving Age, Mob stands for Month of
birth (linear), PUM for Paternal Union Status, and Occ for Paternal occupation (7 categories)
73
Chapter Two: Money, Mentoring and
Making Friends: The Impact of a
Multidimensional Access Programme
on Student Performance
Co-authors:
Kevin Denny (School of Economics & Geary Institute, University College Dublin)
Orla Doyle (Geary Institute, University College Dublin)
Patricia O’ Reilly (Geary Institute, University College Dublin)
74
2.1 Introduction
There is a pronounced global socioeconomic gradient in educational attainment,
particularly at the university level (see Digest of Education Statistics, 2007 for USA;
Eurostudent, 2005 for Europe). Poor attainment by low socioeconomic status (SES) groups
limits inter-generational mobility and reinforces socioeconomic inequalities. There are
multiple causes for such inequalities, including institutional barriers, low quality schooling,
credit constraints, and a lack of parental investment. Recent work has emphasized the
higher returns to intervening early in life to improve educational outcomes (Cunha and
Heckman, 2007; Heckman, Moon, Pinto, Savelyev, and Yavitz, 2010). Yet a more
commonly used policy is targeted intervention programs by universities and colleges to
boost the educational attainment of disadvantaged social groups.
While access programs are becoming increasingly diverse in their approach to
tackling the barriers to progression to university and promoting educational success, the
majority of programs focus exclusively on providing financial supports to students. Thus
much of the literature, as demonstrated in a review by Deming and Dynarski (2009),
concentrates on the effectiveness of financial aid programs such as the Pell Grants and
HOPE scholarships. There are also programs that couple financial aid with other forms of
outreach initiatives such as academic and social supports. Yet evidence of the effectiveness
of these more multifaceted programs is lacking, with only a few rigorous studies adopting
experimental designs or convincing natural experiments (see, for example, Angrist, Lang,
Oreopoulos, 2009; Brock and Richburg-Hayes, 2006; Scrivener, Bloom, LeBlanc, Paxson,
Rouse and Sommo, 2008).
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This study contributes to this literature by using a quasi-experimental design to
evaluate a comprehensive university access program (AP) which operates at University
College Dublin (UCD) in Ireland. UCD is the largest Irish university with over 20,000
undergraduates and postgraduates and is located in the southern suburbs of the city. The AP
is provided to students attending disadvantaged high schools that are linked to the program
based on a set of eligibility criteria. The program operates a range of pre- and post-
university entry support mechanisms which provide financial aid, as well as academic and
social support to the student. The AP differs from many of the US-based programs as aid is
unconditional in that the students receive financial assistance regardless of their university
grades. In addition, students of mixed ability are admitted to the program. Evaluating the
effectiveness of access initiatives targeting disadvantaged students in Ireland is particularly
salient as the rate of return to education is higher than in other European countries and is
comparable to the US (Trostel, Walker and Woolley, 2002). Furthermore, educational
inequality is relatively large in Ireland where, out of twenty OECD countries, the
correlation between father’s education attainment and their children’s education is highest
(Chevalier, Denny and McMahon, 2009), indicating that there is a need for policies to
improve intergenerational mobility.
There is a well developed literature identifying the effects of financial aid on
enrolment to university (for example, Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar, 2006; Kane, 2003;
Dynarski, 2003). The magnitude of this effect is typically around a 5% or less increase in
enrolment for a $1,000 reduction in student costs (Deming and Dynarski, 2009). Financial
aid can also have a positive effect on university completion rates and graduating on time
(e.g. Scott-Clayton, 2009; Dynarski, 2000). There is also some evidence that academic
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support programs, which do not provide financial aid, can be effective. Lesik (2007) finds a
positive relationship between a remedial mathematics program and student retention using
a regression discontinuity design. In addition, Scrivener et al. (2008) identify a positive
treatment effect on first semester academic performance in an experimental evaluation of
the Open Doors program in a US community college which provides improved counselling
and monitoring of students. Finally, the Upward Bound project is the longest running
federal US program which provides additional academic and social services to
disadvantaged students during high school. This program, which resembles many of the
characteristics of the AP discussed here, was evaluated using an experimental design and
found that it had limited effects on both high schools outcomes and post secondary school
outcomes including progression to university and earning a degree (Myers, Olsen, Seftor,
Young, and Tuttle, 2004; Seftor, Mamun, and Schirm, 2009).
Yet there have been relatively few studies that examine multidimensional programs
such as the AP discussed here, that combine financial aid with academic and social
supports both prior to and during university. Exceptions include Angrist et al. (2009) which
conducted an experimental evaluation of the Student Achievement and Retention (STAR)
project in a Canadian university. Students were randomly assigned to three groups which
received academic support, financial incentives or a combination of the two. The program
reduced the probability of first year withdrawal by 10% and had positive effects on GPA.
These effects were greater for students who received the combined financial and academic
supports package. However, the effects were only statistically significant for female
students.
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Another study by Brock and Richburg-Hayes (2006) evaluates the impact of a
Louisiana needs-based scholarship program on course completion and exam performance
of low-income parents attending community college. Students were randomised into a
treatment and control group. In addition to the regular financial aid received by the control
group, the treatment group students were provided with scholarships of $2,000 per annum
if they attended at least half-time and attained, on average, a C grade. While both groups
could avail of counselling services, the treatment group were obliged to attend student
counselling in order to receive the financial aid. The program had multiple positive effects.
In particular, the treatment group were more likely to be full-time college students, passed
more college courses and earned more credits, and were more likely to register for their
second and third years of college.
In addition to the financial, academic and social elements of the Irish access
program, another key aspect which distinguishes it from the STAR project for example, is
that preferential entry to university is provided to students i.e. some AP students enter
university with grades that are lower than the regular minimum grades necessary to be
offered a place at university. Although this preferential treatment is not based on ethnicity,
there are parallels with US and Indian affirmation action (“positive discrimination”)
programs (Deshpande, 2006). Affirmative action programs based on ethnicity have proved
controversial in recent years (see Fryer and Loury (2005) for an interesting discussion).
One criticism is that race-based affirmative action is seen to favour economically well-off
minority students. This has led to calls for the ethnicity criteria to be replaced by socio-
economic criteria. The Irish AP, which is based on socio-economic criteria alone, may
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therefore be informative for policymakers considering a switch away from such race-based
criteria.
In the absence of a randomized control trial, our analysis relies on a natural
experiment which exploits the gradual and non-systematic expansion of the program over
time. The identification strategy compares students from high schools which were chosen
to be part of the program in the early years to those that were chosen to join the program in
later years. As there was no systematic difference in the characteristics of the high schools
which joined the program at different times, a comparison of students from these schools
allow us to identify the treatment effect. Our analysis examines both first and final year
outcomes including exam performance and graduation rates. In addition, we model the
impact of the program on final degree classification which is often overlooked in the
literature, despite some studies finding a high rate of return to university grades (see Jones
and Jackson, 1990; Schweri, 2004; Bratti, Naylor and Smith, 2007).
Overall we find that the program has positive effects on first and final year
outcomes, however unlike the Angrist et al. study, we do not identify any gender effects.
We find similar patterns of results for treated students that entered through the normal entry
system and the ‘affirmative action’ group i.e. the treated students entering with lower
grades. Note that the analysis is based on university administrative data, therefore all results
are conditional on the student having applied and been accepted into the university.
The paper is organised as follows: Section II describes the access program in detail.
Section III discusses the methodology employed and data used in the analysis. Section IV
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presents the main results of the analysis and a description of the sensitivity analysis
conducted. Section V discusses the results and concludes.
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2.2 Description of the Access Program
The access program has been operating at UCD since 1997 and aims to increase
university participation and improve the academic performance of students from socio-
economically disadvantaged backgrounds through a range of pre- and post- entry support
mechanisms. Much of its pre-entry activities involve outreach activities with disadvantaged
schools at both primary (4-12 years) and second level (12-18 years) which focus on raising
student aspirations and creating an awareness of further education. These activities include
field trips to the university where students attend sample lectures, participate in science
labs, as well as a variety of sports and social activities. The AP also organizes pre-entry
orientation programs and shadowing days where high school students follow a university
student through a day at university. The program also provides direct academic support to
high school students for the final state exam in the form of one-to-one tuition and revision
workshops. At a community level, the AP gives presentations to parents and contributes to
community-based events. The number of pre-entry activities provided to schools varied
overtime, with an average of three activities in 1999 and 2000, seven in 2001 and 2002, and
six in 2003 and 2004.21 The aim of these pre-entry activities is to increase the number of
applications to university by disadvantaged students.
The AP also provides information to students about its alternative entry
mechanisms into university. The regular Irish university admissions system is a nationally
21 The activities include: shadowing days, voluntary tutoring, Take 5, Uni 4 U summer school, 5th Year
summer school, achievement awards, educational funding, Uni in Community, Leaving Certificate exam
workshop, Discovering University, Discovering Maths, and the HEAR Scheme.
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administered clearing mechanism based on supply and demand for university places across
all third level institutions. Prior to taking the final state exams at about age 18, high school
students rank their top ten preferred degree courses. Their chosen courses may be at
different universities and/or be different courses at the same university. Several months
later they sit their final state exams. These exam grades are converted to a points-scale from
0-600 in increments of 5 points and are used to rank the students. Offers for a place on a
particular course at a particular university are made to the highest scoring students who
applied for that course at that university.22 Further offers are made on the basis of grades
until all places have been filled. Students who are not offered their first ranked course are
then considered for their second ranked course and the process continues until all places are
allocated. The supply of places on degree courses seldom changes from year to year. The
minimum points necessary for a place on a course, which is set by the grades of the last
person admitted, can fluctuate from year to year.
Under the AP, two types of students are treated. “Merit Treatment” students are
admitted to university through the nationally administered admissions system described
above. About 45% (from a total of 100-140 students per annum) of AP students attain
22 Offers are made on the basis of actual grades attained in the final state exams and not on grades predicted
by teachers, etc. Applications are anonymous and personal statements, references from teachers, subject
specific aptitude tests or interviews are not used in this system. See Gormley and Murphy (2006) for a more
detailed description of the university admissions system in Ireland.
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sufficient grades to meet the minimum points level required for regular university entry and
are allocated a place on their preferred course in the usual manner.
“Discount Treatment” students (the remaining 55% of the total) receive preferential
treatment in attaining their university place such that they receive a concession of up to
20% on the competitive entry points for the course set by the national admissions system.
Thus a certain number of places on each course are reserved for students who do not meet
the minimum points level required for that course. To be offered one of these places they
must meet certain basic requirements (e.g. a medical student must have studied science at
high school) and provide further information regarding their socio-economic circumstances
(discussed below) as well as references from their high school teachers23. The number of
minimum reserved places on each course is based on the size of each faculty in the
university and is relatively fixed. If there is a surplus of suitable and eligible applicants for
these places, the limited places are awarded on the basis of points attained in the final state
exams.
Note that AP students are not guaranteed a place in the university. Essentially, the
number of points they receive in the final state exam and their preferred course choice
determines whether they are classified as Merit or Discount students. Discount students are
not necessarily of a lower ability than Merit students, rather, they may have applied for a
course that required higher minimum points.
23 These references are only considered in tie-break situations i.e. where two or more students with the same
points are competing for a place on the same course. Therefore, this subjective information is not used by the
AP office in the majority of cases.
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Post-entry, both Merit and Discount AP students receive the same supports.
Students receive an extra top-up grant which supplements the regular means tested
government grant24 and in most cases, doubles the amount of financial aid they would
otherwise receive. This grant totalled between €2,200 (US$3,236 in 2008 prices) and
€3,400 (US$5,000 in 2008 prices) per annum during the period under analysis. In addition,
they receive book vouchers and course materials such as laptops, lab coats, etc. The AP
students are also provided with a number of post-entry supports geared towards liaising
with students once they have commenced their studies.
The AP students also participate in a pre-term orientation week where they live on
campus with other AP students to encourage early social and academic integration. The AP
students can also avail of social supports, if required, from student advisors in the AP
office. Such socialization services, which encourage students to interact and ‘make friends’,
are important as there is evidence that strong social networks are associated with increased
college retention and academic performance, particularly for under-represented college
students (Tinto, 1993; Fischer, 2007; Eggens, van der Werf, and Bosker; 2008). Finally, to
help maintain their academic standards while at university, they may also receive free
additional tuition, if required, in the form of one-to-one and group tutorials.
24 All AP students are in receipt of the means tested grant from central government which is valued at €2,900
(US$4,265) and €3,300 (US$4,854) per annum in 2008 prices. This scheme is called the ‘Higher Education
Grant’ and is administered by Local Authorities. The amount of the grant is dependent on family income,
number of siblings and distance to the university. It is provided to all eligible students who are undertaking
full time undergraduate or postgraduate courses (for more information see Clancy and Kehoe, 1999). On
average, almost one third (~32%) of all university students in the country were in receipt of the grant during
the period under analysis (Department of Education and Science Statistical Reports, 1997-2005).
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To be eligible for the program, both Merit and Discount students must meet four
criteria. First, eligibility is means tested such that parental income has to be below a certain
threshold. This threshold is the same as that of the regular means tested grant which any
student can apply for. As family income is not observed in the data, one of the selection
criteria for choosing the Control group is based on receipt of the regular grant. Second, in
order to be eligible for the AP, neither parent must have graduated from a university. Third,
the student’s parents must be a member of the following socio-economic groups: unskilled
manual, semi-skilled manual, skills non-manual, and non-farming agricultural workers.25
Students whose parents are professionals, employers or managers are not eligible for the
AP. As measures of parental education are not available in the data, socio-economic status
is used as a proxy for parental education.26 Finally, the student must be attending a high
school which is designated as ‘disadvantaged’. This criterion is key to the identification
strategy and is discussed in detail below.
25 There is some evidence that farmers and self employed people circumvent the rules on grant eligibility
(Department of Education, 1993), therefore by including these students we could have Control students who
are better-off financially than the Treatment group. Furthermore, as rural schools tended to join the program
at a later stage, we do not wish to conflate the effect of coming from a rural background with that of the
program. Therefore farmers are excluded from the Control group. It is not possible to identify self employed
people using the socioeconomic categories observed in the data.
26 It is possible that there are parents with university level education in the remaining social-economic groups
(i.e. unskilled manual, semi-skilled manual, skills non-manual, and non-farming agricultural workers),
although we assume that this is not the case in general.
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2.3 Estimation & Data Issues
A. Identification Strategy
The identification strategy is similar to that of Lavy and Schlosser (2005) which relied on
the expansion in the number of schools participating in a remedial educational program in
Israel. Hence the identification strategy exploits the gradual, and non-systematic, expansion
of the access program into high schools over time.
The key eligibility criterion of the AP is whether a student attended a disadvantaged
high school linked to the AP prior to entering university. When the program began in the
late 1990’s, certain schools were identified from the Government’s list of officially
designated disadvantaged high schools and became linked to the AP. Schools are included
on the Government’s list based on a range of socio-economic and educational indicators
such as local unemployment rates, measures of poverty, and information on basic literacy
and numeracy levels in the locality. Over time more schools from this list were linked to
the program when funding allowed.27 The data available for the analysis covers students
entering the university between 1999 to 2003, therefore schools linked to the AP in 1999 or
before represent the “always” covered group. Those schools that were included in the
program for the first time in 2004, or after, represent the “never” linked group.28
27 No school which joined the access program has been dropped or exited from the program.
28 The period covered by the data could not be extended in either direction due to changes in data storage
systems and the adoption of a new North American style GPA system to replace a traditional British style
grading system in 2005.
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Essentially, the analysis compares the treated students who participated in the AP,
to students who met all of the other eligibility criteria discussed above, except their schools
had not yet become linked to the AP at the time they applied to university. However, the
high schools which these students attended eventually became linked to the program. The
Treatment group is therefore all Merit and Discount students who attended a disadvantaged
school linked to the program and entered the university between 1999 and 2003. The
Control group consists of students who were in receipt of a state grant, members of one of
the six identified lower social-economic groups and attended a disadvantaged school which
was not linked to the program at university entry, but later became linked to the program.
B. Assumptions of the Identification Strategy
The identification strategy is based on the assumption that there was a random
selection of schools into the program, thus the date at which schools became linked to the
program must not depend on the characteristics of the school. If there was a non-random
selection of schools, this may bias the results as the Treatment group (those who joined
earlier) and the Control group (those who joined later) may systematically differ. However
for several reasons we believe this is not the case. First, there was no self-selection of the
schools into the program as the schools were chosen by the AP to join the scheme. In
regards the expansion of the program, when it first began the AP worked with schools
within a defined catchment area, and when funding allowed, the program expanded to
include new schools chosen from the Government’s list. The expansion of the program to
new schools was dependent on funding from the Irish government, the European Union and
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from philanthropic bodies, and as such, can be viewed as an exogenous source of variation
in the treatment group.
It is important to examine the geographical distribution of the schools which joined
the program at different time points as evidence suggest that the costs of attending
university are lower for students who live closer to the university and that residing near a
university is correlated with ability (Card, 1995, 2001). At the start of the program each of
the country’s seven universities operated access programs independently from each other in
terms of the admissions process. The defined catchment areas of each Dublin university
included both urban areas and a rural area in another part of the country. For example, UCD
was linked to urban disadvantaged high schools located in south west Dublin and to rural
schools in the south-eastern area of the country. Other Dublin universities, such as Trinity
College Dublin and Dublin City University, were linked to schools in other parts of Dublin
city, as well as certain rural areas spread throughout the Republic of Ireland. It is clear from
Table 2.1, which shows the number of high schools joining the program over time by
commuting distance from UCD, that the treatment and control groups includes students
originating from schools which are within commuting and non commuting distance to the
university. Therefore there are students joining at different time points who face similar
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costs in attending university, as measured by the distance of their former high school to the
university.29
In addition, Figures 2.1 and 2.2 report the geographical location of the high schools,
within Ireland and Dublin respectively, by the year they became linked to the UCD
program between 1997 and 2007. It highlights the random nature of the location of linked
schools by year of entry. These figures clearly show that there were schools located in both
urban and rural areas at the start of the program, and as the program expanded over time,
additional schools from both urban and rural areas became linked to the access program.
A further source of exogenous variation in the expansion of the AP was the
introduction of a national access scheme in 2001 to co-ordinate the allocation of places for
access students amongst nearly all Irish universities. Prior to 2001 students attending
schools linked to one institution could only avail of that university’s access program.
However they could attend the other universities but not receive any benefits from the
access program. In 2001 the universities harmonized their admissions schemes. Therefore
students from schools in the catchment area of other universities could apply for the AP at
UCD. Essentially this policy change linked 125 new schools to the AP. Note however these
schools did not receive the pre-entry supports.30 This major administrative change occurred
29 We define commuting and non-commuting distance to the university using the Government’s definition of
commuting distance which is used as a criterion for allocating the level of regular means tested government
grant. At the time of the study, a distance from home of less than 24kms was defined as a commuting
distance.
30 Although they may have received pre-entry treatment by the university which was originally linked to their
school. The majority of Irish access programs offer similar pre-entry supports to those provided by this AP.
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during the period covered by the data and represents an exogenous policy change that
greatly expanded the number of linked high schools.
Finally, there was little overt heterogeneity in the quality of high schools linked to
the AP. The Government’s list from which the schools are drawn is not a ranking and thus
each school is regarded as being equally disadvantaged in that they all receive the same
level of additional government funding compared to regular schools. In sum, these factors
reduce the likelihood that the schools which joined the AP at different times were
systemically different.
To provide evidence that the date on which a school joined the AP is not a function
of its individual characteristics e.g. school quality, Table 2.2 presents two local labour
market characteristics of the electoral district (EDs) of the link schools prior to them
becoming linked.31 As these figures represent Census data at a very detailed level of
disaggregation, they are capturing very local neighbourhood effects.32 The table indicates
that there is no clear relationship between the characteristics of the school’s neighbourhood
and the year in which the school joined the program. Apart from 1999 when the local
unemployment rate and proportion leaving school before age 18 is higher than subsequent
years, there is no systematic variation in the rates over time. This suggests that Control
group students did not attend schools in neighbourhoods that are significantly better or
worse than the treated schools which joined the AP earlier.
31 School quality data are not available to the researchers, therefore local labour market and educational
attainment data is used as a proxy.
32 There are 3440 EDs in Ireland representing 70,280 square kilometres, thus the average size of an ED is 20.4
sq km.
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C. Self Selection
Normally a student must have attended the same linked school for a total of five
years before applying to the university to avail of the access program; however a very small
number of exceptions are made for recent immigrants or returned emigrants. Despite this,
there may be a concern that parents chose to send their children to high schools that were
linked to the program in order to avail of the AP supports, and the alternative entry
mechanism in particular. In Ireland, there are no geographical restrictions on school choice,
so in principle, there could be self-selection into an AP linked school if, for example,
families who send their children to an AP linked schools have some unobservable
characteristics which also affect student outcomes. A priori this is unlikely for two reasons:
firstly, AP schools are typically clustered into disadvantaged neighbourhoods, therefore the
switch to an AP school would require the student to travel a significant distance to another
school, secondly, many low SES parents are unaware of the AP status of the school prior to
school entry, as much of the AP supports do not begin until the later grades at high school.
Another potential self selection issue is that as we only observe students who attend
UCD, the analysis is conditional on enrolment. As a consequence the Control group, who
are socio-demographically similar to the Treatment group, may be a self-selected group as
they chose to attend university without the safety net of the access program. Such students
may perhaps be unobservably more able or more motivated. Table 2.3 reports the average
final state exam grades for the Treatment and Control students. While the grades of the
Control students are slightly higher than the Treatment students, the difference is only
statistically significant in one of the five years. In addition, there are no systematic changes
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in the ability of either the Treatment or Control group over time, suggesting that the
composition of the groups are not changing.
Figure 2.3 shows the university faculty of the Treatment and Control groups before
and after the introduction of the national access scheme in 2001. It shows that firstly, there
is little difference between the faculty choice of the Control group before and after 2001
suggesting that the introduction of the national access scheme did not change the faculty
choice of the Control group, and secondly, there is little difference in the faculty choice of
the Treatment and Control groups, with slightly more AP students studying Commerce and
Law after 2001.
While these data suggest that the Control group do not differ in quality, over time,
in any observable way, it is still possible that they may differ with regard to unobservables.
If this is the case, the treatment effect may be an underestimate of the true treatment effect.
To account for this, we control for both ability (final state exam grades) in our models.
D. Pre- and Post-entry Effects on the Treatment Group
Another related issue is that we do not observe the initial pool of applicants to the
university. It is possible that both grades in the final state exam and faculty of choice are
influenced by the pre-entry supports provided by the AP (such as the outreach activities and
academic support). Hence there may be a correlation between unobservables that affect the
outcome and the probability of treatment. As we only evaluate university based outcomes,
such as exam performance, it is conceivable that the results may be driven by such selection
effects in either a positive or negative direction. On the one hand, the pre-entry supports
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may increase the student’s state exam grades, which are required for entry into the
university, either directly (through additional tuition) or indirectly (by improving
motivation). On the other hand, there could be a complacency effect in that the student
reduces their effort in their state exam in the belief that they may be able to enter university
with lower required grades. The impact of this selection effect on the results will depend on
which effect dominates. It is also possible that the pre-entry supports were not effective at
improving entry exam grades and thus progression to university. In this case, any observed
treatment effects on university outcomes could be attributed to the post entry supports and
selection into university would not be an issue.
As the distribution of the pre-entry supports provided by the AP to the linked
schools is not uniform across all linked schools we can investigate these potential effects.
Some schools receive more pre-entry activities than others, while some schools only
receive the alternative entry mechanism support. In general, schools that are located in
urban areas receive more supports than the rural schools. In addition, the number of
services provided to schools typically increased over time. To investigate the impact of
variation in pre-entry supports, we estimate our results separately for students that attended
schools which received full pre-entry support and those that attended schools which only
received limited pre-entry support.
E. Identifying Suitable Controls for Discount Students
As we are comparing Discount students to Merit students who have higher final state
exam grades, a potential concern is that our Treatment and Control groups are not
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comparable. However this is not necessarily the case as there is an overlap in the support of
the entrance exam grades for these groups. Table 2.4 shows that the distribution of exam
grades intersects for Control students and all but the lowest achieving Discount students. In
some cases we have Control students with the same exam grades as Discount students in
the same course but who entered the university in a year where the minimum points level
had been lower. For example, there are Discount students who entered the Agricultural
Science degree in 2001 with 320 points when the minimum required for the general student
body was 330, and the following year a Control student entered with 320 points as the
minimum required had fallen to 310. In addition, Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of
grades in the final high school state exam for Discount, Merit, and Control group students.
It shows the similarity of the Merit and Control group students, which largely follows a
normal distribution, while the Discount students are skewed to the left.
There are also Control students with the same points as Discount students who
entered in the same year but are taking courses with lower minimum entry requirements
due to those courses being of lower demand in a particular year. One could argue that these
lower demand courses may be of a different difficulty level - however we also estimated
the models including the student's faculty to control for the inherent difficulty of the course;
however the results are very similar to our base results which do not control for faculty.
This is particularly an issue for the Arts degree course, which is the lowest entry
points course and the largest course, as there are Discount students who have lower points
than anyone else in the university and few Control students with a similar level of points.
Table 2.4 shows that, in particular, there are large differences in the number of Discount
and Control students in the lowest points category. While this will not affect the results for
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higher achieving student (>400 points), it may downwardly bias the results for the low
point students if we are comparing the low point Discount students to Control students who
mostly have higher points.
F. Data & Method
We use pooled cross sections of student level administrative data from the
university’s admissions and grading systems which contains information on all students
entering the university from 1999 to 2003 inclusive.33 The data contain information on
student outcomes at university, pre-university academic performance, high school attended,
grant status, the student’s age, gender, treatment status, and markers of AP eligibility such
as the socio-economic group of the student’s family. Some school-level information was
matched to the individual student-level data using a school identifier. For example, census
information on average years of schooling and unemployment rates in the electoral district
of a particular school were included. School level information regarding exam results and
other school “quality” variables could not be included as this information is not available to
researchers in Ireland. Descriptive statistics on the socio-demographic and academic
33 The working sample excludes those with missing data and students who bypass the regular admissions
system for any reason including disabled students, students entering university later in life, as well as
overseas students. Students who died during their time at the university have also been excluded from the
analysis.
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characteristics of the students broken down by the general study body, Control group
students, and Discount and Merit AP students are provided in Table 2.4.
The table also reports the results of balancing tests comparing the Control group to
the Discount group and the Merit group respectively. It shows that there are no statistical
differences between the groups in regards to gender and grant status. However the Discount
group does differ from the Control group with respect to the proportion of fathers working
in non-manual and manual employment, with more Control group fathers working within
the manual sector than the Discount students’ fathers. The groups also differ with regard to
their grades in the final state exam, with the Discount students typically receiving fewer
points than the Control students, and the Merit students following a different distribution of
points than the Control students. Finally, due to the identification strategy, the Control
group students also typically entered university in different years to the Treatment group
students. To control for these differences in student characteristics, all models control for
year of university entry, gender, and number of points attained in final state exams.34 In
addition, the distance from the high school to the university in kilometres, local
unemployment rates and education levels in the locality of the high school, are also
included to control for potential selection effects. Only the results for the main outcomes
are presented.
34 Throughout these models we have controlled for points in the final state exam linearly, however the pattern
of results holds when controlling for exam points using different non-linear functions.
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The outcomes of interest measure different facets of academic performance in the
first year of university as well as the overall performance of the student in their degree
course.35 The first and final year outcomes are categorical variables which are defined as
receiving an honours grade, a pass grade, or failing/dropping out of university in either first
year or final year respectively.36 An ‘honours’ grade is defined as receiving a first class
honours, a second class upper honours, or a second class lower honours, which is the
traditional grading system used in Ireland and Britain rather than using the exact grades or a
North American-style GPA system. A comparison of the British/Irish and North American
grading system is provided in Appendix Table 2A1. A ‘pass’ grade is defined as receiving a
pass grade. Finally, ‘fail/dropping out’ is defined as either failing the exams or dropping
out of university. Note that the fail/dropping out category for first year outcome includes
students who dropped out before sitting their first year exams, as well as those who sat the
first year exams and failed. For the final year outcome this category includes those who
dropped out of university at any point in time during their degree program. Table 2.5
compares the outcome variables broken down by the general study body, Control group
students, and Discount and Merit AP students. In general, the Discount students perform
35 We do not to examine outcomes in the second year, third year, etc., of a degree course as different courses
are of different durations and some courses use pre-final year exam results for final degree grades whereas
others do not. In addition, the majority of dropping-out (~80%) in Ireland occurs between first and second
year, which is a far higher than the UK figure of 56% (Smith and Naylor, 2001).
36 Unfortunately it is not possible within this data to distinguish between students who repeat years because of
failing exams, illness or by choice.
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worse than the Control students, while the Merit group outperform the Control group. The
analysis below will test whether these differences can be attributed to the AP.
Rather than using a standard ‘differences in differences’ method which would
require controlling for school fixed effects by including dummy variables for each school,
we estimate a simple ‘differences’ model. This issue arises as there are over 300 linked
schools involved in the AP and only 168 students in the Treatment group. While we report
differences-in-differences results in the sensitivity analysis we do not report them as the
main results as the relatively small sample size makes these estimates necessarily
imprecise.37 Ordered probit is used to model the two main outcomes and marginal effects
are reported.
37 Due to the nature of the program some schools only send a small number of students, if any, in a given year
to the university.
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2.4 Results
The impact of the access program on first and final year student outcomes is presented in
Table 2.6. The analysis is conducted for all AP students in models (1) and (3) separately for
Discount and Merit students in models (2) and (4), by including an interaction term for
treatment type. The same Control group is used in each analysis. The first year outcomes
are reported in the upper half of the table and the final year outcomes are reported on the
bottom half of the table. It shows that the AP has a positive effect on first and final year
outcomes. Model 1 shows that AP students are 12% more likely to receive an honours
grade and 7% less likely to receive a pass grade. In addition, being in the program reduces
the probability that the AP students will either fail or drop out during their first year at
university by 5%. Model 2 indicates that the results are similar for both types of treatment
students. The AP increases the probability of receiving an honours and reducing the
probability of failing/dropping out in first year for Discount students, and increases the
probability of receiving an honours and reducing the probability of receiving a pass grade
or failing/dropping out in first year for Merit students. The sizes of the effects are similar
for both Discount and Merit students and a Wald test reveals that the coefficients are not
statistically different from each other (χ2=0.02, p=0.898).
Model 3 shows that the impacts of the program extends beyond first year, such that
the AP increases the probability of receiving an honours degree by 8%. It also reduces the
probability of receiving a pass degree by 4%, while reducing the likelihood of failing or
dropping out of university by 5%. Thus the program improves the overall graduation rate
for AP students. Model 4 suggest that these effects are primarily driven by Merit students,
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as the AP increases the probability of receiving an honours degree by 10% and reduces the
probability of passing or failing by 4% and 6% respectively, while having no impact on the
final degree outcomes for Discount students. However a Wald test indicates that the
coefficients for Discount and Merit groups are not statistically different from each other
(χ2=0.21, p=0.647). Thus, as the program appears to have the same impact on Discount and
Merit students, we only examine the impact of the program for all treatment students in all
further analyses. Overall, the program has long term effects in that it helps the student reach
the final year, as well as improving their overall degree performance.
For the vast majority of university courses, the first year does not count for the
overall degree classification. However the grades from individual first year courses might
be considered by employers whilst the student is in final year and conducting a job search
whilst their final degree classification is yet to be decided. It could also be the case that the
program is changing the students’ first year goals. They may feel that they “owe” it to the
course administrators to get as high a mark as possible in first year or the program may
convince students that getting as high a grade in first year is intrinsically good for some
other reason. Control students might be content to just pass first year and not attain high
grades. Thus the effect of the program in first year may reflect this “goal setting” effect.
However we find that the program still has significant effects on overall degree
performance although the point estimates are smaller than the effects on first year
outcomes.
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A. Robustness, Sensitivity, and Extensions
Table 2.7 reports the results from eight additional analyses which test the robustness
and sensitivity of the main results. The first six models investigate whether the program has
differential effects across different groups of students by including interactions for low and
high ability students, male and female students, and students originating from schools
within commuting distance to the university or not. The first year outcomes are reported in
the upper half of the table and the final year outcomes are reported on the bottom half of the
table. Models (1) and (2) report the main effect of the AP on student outcomes and an
interaction effect to examine whether the program benefits high or low ability students.
Students who attained 400 points or less in the final state exam are classified as low ability
students, and those who achieved more than 400 points are classified as high ability
students. 400 points is roughly the 75th percentile of attainment in the final state exam taken
by school leavers and is sufficient to enter the two largest faculties in the university, Arts
and Science, with more prestigious courses like Law and Medicine requiring well in excess
of 500 points. The results indicate no interaction effects suggesting that the AP has the
same effect on low and high ability students.
Models (3) and (4) test whether the AP has differential impacts by gender as found
by Angrist et al. (2009). Overall, we find that the AP has no differing effects on males and
females for either first or final year outcomes. While the main effects remains statistical
significant, the interaction effects are not. These results differ from the STAR program,
which is similar in some respects to the AP considered here, yet it only found effects for
females.
101
To address the Card argument (1995, 2001), which suggests that the costs of
attending university are lower for students living closer to the university, models (5) and (6)
include an interaction term indicating whether the student’s high school was within
commuting distance to the university. Again, the main effects of the AP on student
outcomes remains, however there are no interaction effects, suggesting that distance to the
university does not influence the impact of the program on students’ outcomes.
While the main analysis does not control for school fixed effects due to the large
number of dummy variables that would need to be included in the analysis, models (7) and
(8) reports the results of the estimation including approximately 160 high school dummies.
While the results are not statistically significant, possibility due to the reduced sample size,
they are consistent with the main analysis in terms of their size and direction.38 As an
alternative to using school dummies to pick up school fixed effects we could alternatively
use some measure of school quality. However school quality variables are not publicly
available in Ireland therefore it is difficult to ascertain the heterogeneity in the quality of
38 An underlying assumption of the analysis is that the average change in the outcome is presumed to be the
same for both the Control and, counterfactually, for the Treatment group if they had not participated in the
AP. We are currently assuming that the school level inputs are constant overtime. However, as discussed
above, data on the quality of schools are not available for Ireland, therefore we cannot verify this assumption.
For a violation of this assumption to bias our results greatly, the quality and distribution of school level inputs
would have to have changed significantly in a short period of time (within 5 years). While we cannot observe
this directly, it is unlikely to be the case.
102
schools linked to the program. In one of the few sources available to us, The Sunday Times
Guide to Secondary Schools in Ireland (Murphy and McConnell, 2006), nearly all of the
~300 schools39 linked to the AP are in the bottom 300 places when ranked by the proportion
of students that enrol in university.
A number of additional alternative specifications were considered. For example, we
did not find the treatment effect to vary by the faculty of the student. Furthermore, we
investigated the existence of peer effects in relation to the program; however we could not
identify an effect based on having a high proportion of fellow AP students in a particular
course or students from a similar social background. For all of these alternative
specifications, the sample size may inhibit the detection of an effect.
B. Impact of Variations in Financial Aid Package
Unlike Angrist et al. (2009), our natural experiment does not allow us to identify the
relative effects of the individual financial, academic, and social supports. However
variation in the levels of financial aid over time allows us to identify the effects of changes
in aid on student outcomes. The amount of financial aid made available to each student
changed during the period covered by the data due to funding availability which is
exogenous. Furthermore the value of the regular state means tested grant, which all AP
39 Not all of the linked schools sent students to UCD in the study period. The Sunday Times Guide is only
available for 2004/2005, therefore it is not possible to examine variation in the university participation rates
for the schools before and after they became linked to the AP.
103
students additionally receive, also changed over time. The sum of the total value of the
AP’s aid package was particularly high in 2000, 2001 and 2003 with an average of €6,313
(expressed in 2008 prices) per annum. While the average in 1999, 2002 and 2004 was
relatively lower at €5,407 per annum. Therefore there were substantial variations in aid
across time for students during their first year of study. As there was not much variation in
the total aid package received by student over the entire degree program, only first year
outcomes are examined here.
To determine the impact of changes in financial aid on first year exam results, Table
2.8 presents an ordered probit model including an interaction indicating whether the student
entered university in a “higher value” year relative to entering in a “lower value” year.
Although the estimated results follow a pattern suggesting that the extra funding was
beneficial, the first year outcomes for students who received the high value package were
not statistically different from the students who received the lower value package.
Furthermore no significant effects of the extra funding were detected when alternative
models were estimated. Clearly this does not suggest that the AP’s financial package has no
effect on student performance, however it does imply that increasing the value of the
package from an average of €5,407 to €6,313 per annum did not lead to changes in student
achievements. The analysis rests on the assumption that there were no other differences in
the AP’s activities in these high value years that may influence outcomes. It also assumes
that the unobserved characteristics of students in the high value years did not differ from
students in low value years.
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C. Selection Effects
As discussed above, one may argue that the AP’s pre-entry treatment may be changing the
pre-entry academic achievements of the students. The pre-entry activities, such as summer
schools and extra tutorials, may directly improve performance in the final state exam, thus
upwardly biasing the treatment effects observed above. Information regarding the number
and type of pre-entry activities is available for all UCD linked schools in each year. A
school which received three or more activities is considered a full pre-entry supports
school, while a school receiving less than three activities is considered a limited supports
school. The differences in the number of pre-entry supports provided to schools were
primarily a result of resource limitations. As the resources available to fund these activities
varied from year to year, this affected the roll-out of all pre-entry services to all schools,
with distance being a key factor. While most urban schools were not limited in the amount
of supports they received, there are some rural schools which are classified as limited and
other rural schools classified as non-limited support schools. Thus in order to examine
whether varying the level of pre-entry supports affect student performance at university,
while controlling for distance from the university, we re-estimate the results for students
who attended limited pre-entry support schools and full pre-entry support schools.40
The results presented in Table 2.9 show that students who attended the full pre-
entry support schools had better first year outcomes than students who attended the limited
40 Note that information on the pre-entry activities in schools linked to other universities is not available. Thus
this analysis is restricted to the UCD linked schools.
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support schools. Attending a full pre-entry support school increases the probability of
achieving honours by 16% and reduces the probability of passing or failing by 10% and 6%
respectively. However, a Wald test reveals that the coefficients for the limited support
schools and the full supports schools are not statistically different from each other
(χ2=0.04, p=0.853). In addition, there was no statistical differences on the impact of the
program on final year outcomes for the students who attended the limited pre-entry support
schools and the full pre-entry support schools (χ2=1.11, p=0.292). Overall, this indicates
that there is little evidence that students from the high support schools are systematically
better than the students from the limited support schools, suggesting that the pre-entry
activities are having a minimal effect on the pre-entry academic performance of the
students and that the main results are not driven by selection bias.
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2.5 Conclusion
This study examines the effectiveness of a multidimensional access program
designed to increase the number of low socio-economic status students attending an Irish
university and to improve the academic performance of such students within the university.
Arising from the very low university participation rates of low SES students, the majority
of Irish universities operate access programs which provide a combination of social,
academic, and financial supports to participating students. Yet despite the prevalence of
such access programs in Ireland, none have been evaluated to date. While there is some
evidence that multidimensional programs can be effective (e.g. Angrist et al. 2009; Brock
and Richburg Hayes, 2006), there is a dearth of research on this topic, particularly outside
of North America.
A clear advantage of this study is that it includes multiple outcomes which go well
beyond initial enrolment, which is the focus of much of this literature. The results indicate
that the access program led to significant improvements in the academic performance of
students, and unlike many previous programs, these effects persisted throughout their time
in college. Indeed, a distinctive characteristic of this program is that it continues the
academic, social, and financial support beyond first year. The program has significant
positive benefits on a range of first and final year outcomes including exam performance
and retention rates. Such positive effects are found for students whose university entrance
grades met the normal entry criteria (Merit Students), and also for those (Discount
Students) who were admitted with grades below the normal entry threshold for their course.
It is particularly significant that this program reduced the probability of dropping out of
university as withdrawal from a degree, in addition to the financial implications, may also
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have long lasting self-esteem and stigmatizing effects particularly if the student has
miscalculated their relative ability to finish the program. There are additional financial
implications from failing exams, as during the time period under analysis, such students
incurred full fees to repeat the year.
The program improves the first year exam performance of both Discount and Merit
treated students, in that it increases the probability of achieving an honours degree and
reduces the probability of either failing or only just passing. In addition, the AP improves
the final degree classification. That there are no gender effects is contrary to much of this
literature (e.g. Angrist et al. 2009), and the wider intervention literature (Anderson, 2008;
Schweinhart et al. 2005; Clampet-Lundquist et al. 2006).
The program also has positive effects on the students’ final year outcomes. It
increases the graduation rate by ~5%. This effect is significant and represents the
cumulative effect of the program in reducing drop-out at each stage of university life. This
effect is in line with the graduation effects of about 3-6 percentage points found in financial
aid based scholarship programs (e.g. Dynarski, 2008, Scott-Clayton, 2009). Given the high
private returns to completing a university degree (e.g. Jaeger and Page, 1996; Callan and
Harmon, 1999) this implies a significant financial benefit to access students who make it to
graduation. The size of the graduation effects hold for both females and males, which
differs somewhat to the literature, which typically finds larger effects for females in terms
of course completion (e.g. Dynarski, 2008; Garibaldi et al. 2007). Increasing the graduation
rates not only generates long term benefits for the students through increased employment
opportunities and earnings, it also generates benefits to the university in terms of improving
its reputation and maximising its resources. While the program helps the students to make it
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to graduation, it has no impact on the probability that they will graduate on time. This
contrasts with Scott-Clayton (2009) which finds that an incentives based program reduces
time to completion. Graduating late will have explicit costs of studying for at least an extra
year. In Ireland, there is an extra disincentive to not delay graduation as tuition fees, which
are normally waived for Irish students, are payable for repeated years of a degree course.
There are also implicit costs of forgone graduate earnings.
Given that the program has a positive impact overall on Discount students who
received preferential entry treatment, affirmative action or positive discrimination does not
appear to compromise academic standards. This suggests that grade concessions offers to
low SES students may be an effective means of reducing educational inequality. Note that
the positive discrimination made by the AP occurs on a relatively small scale both in terms
of the absolute number of students admitted and the level of grade remission that an
individual student receives. Nonetheless this study suggests that access program based on
socio-economic status can be effective. Thus, calls for the US affirmative action programs
to move away from the ethnicity based eligibility criteria to a socio-economic based criteria
may prove effective.
It is important to recognise that these results may overstate the post entry effect of
the AP if the program’s pre-entry activities in high school raise the academic quality of the
treatment group. As this study only observes students within the university, and not the
inital pool of applicants, we cannot directly measure the extent of this problem. However, a
comparison of the outcomes of students who attending high schools which received a high
level of pre-entry activities, do not systemically differ from students who attended high
schools which received fewer pre-entry activities. This suggests that the pre-entry activities
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had a minimal effect on the pre-entry academic performance of the students and that the
main results are mainly driven by the post entry intervention.
This study also finds that a high level of financial aid may not be the main
contributor to university success as variation in aid over time does not adversely impact on
student performance. However there are limits as to how much one can extrapolate from
this result. Firstly, the sample size used for this analysis is quite low as only AP students
can be included; therefore the estimated results may not be precise. Secondly, based on the
data available, it is not possible to speculate with any degree of confidence if an increase by
more than around €900 (about $1,100 in 2010 prices) would have had any effect. Nor is it
possible to estimate if a reduction in the value of the financial package below an amount of
around €5,400 (about $6,630) would have any effect on average student performances.
However in reducing the amount of financial aid to students, consideration should be given
to the possible effects of such a reduction on student employment as students may enter
part-time employment to offset the reduction in financial aid (although there is currently no
consensus in the literature on the effects of student employment on academic outcomes).
Yet a recent paper (Denny, 2010), which found that the abolition of university fees in
Ireland in 1996 had little impact on student progression to univeristy, suggests that students
in Ireland do not face credit constraints. Thus, as found here, reducing the value of financial
aid does not appear to effect university performance. Unlike many US programs, financial
aid in this AP is not conditional on achieving a particular grade, except where students need
to repeat an academic year in which case they do not receive the aid during that year. See
for example, Scott Clayton (2009), Dynarski (2008) or Angrist et al. (2009), for fairly
mixed evidence on the effectiveness of such conditional aid.
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While the design of the evaluation precludes an analysis of the relative effects of the
different components of the program, this study has some general implications for the AP
in regards continuing to support both Merit and Discount students and potentially reducing
the size of financial aid. The access program discussed here started by treating students
during high school, yet in recent years they have begun working with primary (elementary)
schools. This is line with evidence that interventions which begin earlier in the lifecycle
have the highest pay-off (see Carneiro and Heckman, 2003 for example). A strong
argument can be made that society should invest in education to ensure that children’s’
education is not constrained by their parents’ socio-economic status. While there is more
than one cause of educational inequality, and hence there is no single global solution, the
multidimensional intervention studied here is one useful tool available to policymakers that
can help address this issue.
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Figure 2.1 Program Expansion by Geographical Location in Ireland
Note: pre Hear refers to before 2001.
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Figure 2.2 Program Expansion by Geographical Location in Dublin
Note: pre Hear refers to before 2001.
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Figure 2.3 University Faculty by Treatment and Control Groups Before and After the 2001 Reform
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Figure 2.4 Distribution of High School Grades in Final State Exam by Treatment and Control Groups
Distribution of Grades in Final State Exam by Treatment/Control
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Tables for Chapter Two
Table 2.1 Program Expansion and Commuting Distance from High Schools to University
Year High School Became Linked
to the AP
Not Within Commuting
Distance to UCD
Within Commuting Distance
to UCD
1999 5 14
2000 2 2
2001 34 30
2002 11 4
2003 35 11
Post 2003 10 11
Note: No. of high schools which joined the AP over time displayed by whether they are within
commuting distance to UCD or not.
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Table 2.2 Labour Market Characteristics in Access Program School Localities by Year of Linkage
Year of linkage to
AP
Number of schools
entering program
Proportion in locality
unemployed in 1996
Proportion in locality leaving
education before age 18 in 1996
95% CI
Lower
Bound
95% CI
Upper
Bound
1999 or before 21
.11
(.01)
.11
(.02) .09 .13
2000 6
.06
(.01)
.14
(.03) .04 .08
2001 93
.09
(.00)
.13
(.01) .08 .10
2002 23
.09
(.01)
.11
(.01) .08 .10
2003 58
.07
(.00)
.13
(.01) .07 .08
2004 or later 40
.08
(.00)
.12
(.01) .07 .09
National average
.07
(.00)
.18
(.01) .06 .07
Note: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and the lower and upper bound of the 95% confidence interval
reported. The figures represent the average labour market conditions, as reported in the 1996 Census at the electoral
division level, in the locality of the schools which joined the AP between 1999 and 2005. The average size of an ED
is 20.4 sq km. The number of observations (at school level) are weighted by number of students from school in final
sample. No school has left the access program having been chosen to join it.
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Table 2.3 Average High School Grades in Final State Exam for Treatment and Control Groups by
Year of Linkage
Year of linkage Treatment Control T-test of difference
1999
377
(49)
380
(22)
.30
2000
411
(64)
437
(50)
1.30
2001
397
(59)
426
(47)
2.79***
2002
406
(63)
424
(52)
.59
2003 or later
425
(75)
433
(37)
.20
Note: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) reported. The average university entrance exam grades are
based on final school exams consisting of 6 exams worth 100 points each, for a maximum score of 600 points.
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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Table 2.4 Student Characteristics
Student Characteristics General
Student
Population
Control group
Students
Discount AP
students
Merit AP
students
Diff between
Control &
Discount
Diff between
Control &
Merit
% % % %
Male 45.98 30.35 37.21 31.71 χ2 =1.39 χ2 =.05
In receipt of means tested
state grant 16.94 100 100 100 χ2 =.0 χ2 =.0
Father’s socio-economic
group
Higher 70.2 0.00 0.00 0.00
Non-Manual 21.46 44.75 57.69 48.65 χ2=2.91* χ2=0.20
Manual 8.33 55.25 42.31 51.35
Grade in final state exam
300-350 3.12 1.56 48.24 6.10
355-400 21.38 29.96 30.59 25.61
405-450 27.75 40.47 8.24 28.05 χ2=133.81*** χ2=11.35**
455-500 23.06 16.73 10.59 26.83
505-550 15.65 7.00 2.35 8.54
556-600 9.05 4.28 0.00 4.88
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Year of entry to university
1999 19.97 24.90 11.63 17.07
2000 20.22 21.01 19.77 13.41
2001 19.96 24.51 15.12 13.41 χ2=23.02*** χ2=19.43***
2002 20.43 19.46 25.58 39.02
2003 19.42 10.12 27.91 17.07
Sample size 13,478 257 86 82
Note: Discount students are those who entered the university with reduced entry grades. Merit students are
those who entered the university without reduced entry grades. The Control group include financially eligible
students (i.e. grant holders), whose parents are not professionals or employers and who attended schools that
subsequently became linked to the AP.
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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Table 2. 5 First and Final Year Student Outcome Variables
Outcome Variables General
Student
Population
Control group
Students
Discount AP
students
Merit AP
students
Diff between
Control &
Discount
Diff between
Control &
Merit
First Year outcomes: % % % %
Honours 46.89 34.63 20.93 48.78
Pass 41.46 52.53 61.63 42.68 χ2=5.45* χ2=5.83*
Fail/Drop-out 11.65 12.84 17.44 8.54
Final Degree outcomes:
Honours 62.94 66.67 53.49 73.17
Pass 14.81 16.08 23.26 15.85 χ2=4.85* χ2=1.94
Fail/Drop-out 22.26 17.25 23.26 10.98
Sample size 13,478 257 86 82
Note: Discount students are those who entered the university with reduced entry grades. Merit students are
those who entered the university without reduced entry grades. The Control group include financially eligible
students (i.e. grant holders), whose parents are not professionals or employers and who attended schools that
subsequently became linked to the AP.
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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Table 2.6 Base Results: Impact of the Access Program on First and Final Year Outcomes
All Discount Merit
First year outcomes (1) (2)
Honours .122**
(.054)
.130*
(.071)
.121*
(.063)
Pass -.073**
(.036)
-.083
(.053)
-.077*
(.046)
Fail/Dropped out -.049**
(.019)
-.047**
(.020)
-.044**
(.018)
Pseudo R2 .163 .163
Sample size 425 425
Final degree outcomes (3) (4)
Honours .083*
(.048)
.066
(.061)
.096*
(.052)
Pass -.033*
(.020)
-.027
(.026)
-.040*
(.024)
Fail/Dropped out -.050*
(.029)
-.039
(.035)
-.056*
(.029)
Pseudo R2 .182 .098
Sample size 425 425
Note: All 4 models are ordered probit. Marginal effects and clustered standard errors (in parenthesis) reported.
The treatment effect is participation in the access program. Discount students are those who entered the
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university with reduced entry grades. Merit students are those who entered the university without reduced entry
grades. The Control group include financially eligible students (i.e. grant holders), whose parents are not
professionals or employers and who attended schools that subsequently became linked to the AP. All models
include: year of university entry, gender, number of points attained in final state exams, distance from the high
school to the university in km, and local unemployment rates and education levels in the locality of the high
school.
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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Table 2.7 Robustness and Sensitivity Results: Impact of the Access Program on First and Final Year Outcomes
Ability effects (low v high) Gender effects (male v female) Commuting distance effects
(commuting v non commuting)
Fixed effects model
Main Effect
of AP
Interaction of AP
& low ability students
Main Effect
of AP
Interaction of AP
& male students
Main Effect
of AP
Interaction of AP &
commuting distance
First year outcomes (1) (3) (5) (7)
Honours .107
(.078)
.030
(.100)
.102*
(.054)
.065
(.098)
.133**
(.067)
-.030
(.085)
.098
(.086)
Pass -.064
(.050)
-.018
(.060)
-.060*
(.035)
-.040
(.066)
-.080*
(.044)
.017
(.046)
-.060
(.056)
Fail/Dropped out -.044
(.029)
-.012
(.039)
-.041**
(.021)
-.025
(.033)
-.054**
(.024)
.013
(.040)
-.038
(.031)
Pseudo R2 .163 .163 .164 .257
Sample size 425 425 425 267
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Final degree outcomes (2) (4) (6) (8)
Honours .108
(.071)
-.034
(.108)
.099*
(.060)
-.053
(.101)
.102*
(.061)
-.044
(.106)
.108
(.085)
Pass -.043
(.030)
.013
(.040)
-.039
(.025)
.020
(.035)
-.041
(.026)
.016
(.039)
-.025
(.020)
Fail/Dropped out -.065
(.042)
.021
(.068)
-.059*
(.035)
.033
(.066)
-.061*
(.036)
.027
(.068)
-.083
(.065)
Pseudo R2 .102 .098 .098 .175
Sample size 425 425 425 280
Note: All 8 models are ordered probit. Marginal effects and clustered standard errors (in parenthesis) reported. The first three columns report interactions for the
students’ ability using points received in final state exam, gender, and whether the student’s high school is within commuting distance to the university or not. Both the
main effect of the AP and the interaction effect are reported. The treatment effect is participation in the access program. The Control group include financially eligible
students (i.e. grant holders), whose parents are not professionals or employers and who attended schools that subsequently became linked to the AP. All models apart
from the fixed effect model include: year of university entry, gender, number of points attained in final state exams, distance from the high school to the university in
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km, and local unemployment rates and education levels in the locality of the high school. The fixed effect model includes: high school dummies, year of entry, and
number of points attained in final state exams.
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Table 2.8 Impact of Variation in Financial Aid on First Year Outcomes
First year outcomes Effect of financial aid package
Main Effect of AP Interaction of AP & high aid
package
Honours .107
(.070)
.029
(.087)
Pass -.063
(.046)
-.017
(.052)
Fail/Dropped out -.043*
(.025)
-.012
(.035)
Pseudo R2 .163
Sample size 425
Note: The model is ordered probit. Marginal effects and clustered standard errors (in parenthesis) reported.
The model includes an interaction indicating whether the student received a high financial aid package or a
low financial aid package. The Control group include financially eligible students (i.e. grant holders), whose
parents are not professionals or employers and who attended schools that subsequently became linked to the
AP. The model includes: year of university entry, gender, number of points attained in final state exams,
distance from the high school to the university in km, and local unemployment rates and education levels in
the locality of the high school.
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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Table 2.9 Impact of Access Program on Student Performance for Students from Limited and Full
Pre-entry Support Schools
Effect of pre-entry AP supports
Limited pre-entry supports Full pre-entry supports
First year outcomes
Honours .204
(.183)
.162**
(.078)
Pass -.142
(.151)
-.100*
(.057)
Fail/Dropped out -.061*
(.034)
-.062***
(.024)
Pseudo R2 .166
Sample size 358
Final degree outcomes
Honours -.060
(.128)
.077
(.060)
Pass .020
(.039)
-.030
(.025)
Fail/Dropped out .040
(.089)
-.047
(.035)
Pseudo R2 .091
Sample size 358
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Note: All 2 models are ordered probit. Marginal effects and clustered standard errors (in parenthesis)
reported. The treatment effect is participation in the access program. The Control group include financially
eligible students (i.e. grant holders), whose parents are not professionals or employers and who attended
schools that subsequently became linked to the AP. All models apart from the fixed effect model include:
year of university entry, gender, number of points attained in final state exams, distance from the high
school to the university in km, and local unemployment rates and education levels in the locality of the high
school. The fixed effect model includes: high school dummies, year of entry, and number of points attained
in university entry exams.
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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Appendix for Chapter Two
Table 2A1 Comparison of British/Irish and North American Grading Systems
US: GPA British/Irish: Award
Greater than or equal to 3.68 First Class Honours
From 3.08 to 3.67 inclusive Second Class Honours, Grade 1
From 2.48 to 3.07 inclusive Second Class Honours, Grade 2
From 2.00 to 2.47 inclusive Pass
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Chapter Three: Piloting the Nation.
What Do We Learn From Pilot
Interventions?
Co-author:
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“In many ways the social experiment method is the most convincing method of
evaluation” Blundell and Costa Dias, 2002, p92.
3.1 Introduction
Experimental evidence has become the “gold standard” of policy evaluation. It is
becoming increasingly common to conduct experimental studies where one group is
randomly allocated a treatment while another group is used as a control. Prominent
examples of such studies include the National Supported Work Demonstration (Lalonde,
1986), the Canadian Self Sufficiency Project (Card and Robins, 1998), the STAR
(Krueger and Whitmore, 2001) or the Mexican Progresa (Behrman, Sengupta and Todd,
2005). In the absence of random allocation, a pilot scheme may be introduced in part of a
country, to test the implications of a policy on a small scale, typically by matching treated
and control groups, as for example in the UK New Deal for Young People (Blundell,
Costa Dias, Meghir and Van Reenen, 2001). The results of such experiments and pilots
are then analysed before implementing the policy on a wider basis. The UK Civil Service
(Jowell, 2003) and the US Department of Education (Coalition for Evidence Based
Policy, 2003) for example, place a premium on the results of experimental “pilot” studies
with significant weight also given to the results of quasi-experimental “pilots”. The
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estimates of such an experimental approach are believed to have a high degree of internal
validity41.
However the external validity of pilot results is not often questioned even though
there are several reasons why the effects of the pilot scheme and a later national
implementation of a scheme may differ. This usually has to do with differences in
information, costs and general equilibrium effects. Firstly, there may be a time-lag of
several years between the implementation of the pilot scheme and the extension of the
policy to the full population. The change in the macroeconomic conditions may then alter
the behaviours of the individuals subject to the policy. Secondly, the characteristics of the
areas/groups treated by the pilot scheme may differ from those of the areas/groups to
which the policy will be later extended. This is the case for example if the pilot is
implemented on an area/group that has higher risk or worse characteristics than the
area/group at which the policy is later extended to. Third, the parameters of the pilot and
national roll-out of the policy may differ; i.e. a relatively generous pilot scheme may be
too costly to implement on a wider basis42. Fourth, there may be general equilibrium
effects that do not materialise in a small scale pilot but alter the behaviour of all agents,
treated or not, under the national implementation.
In this chapter we estimate the effects of the national extension of the Education
Maintenance Allowance (EMA), a conditional cash transfer scheme aimed at increasing
41 For a broad and non-technical discussion of the threats to internal validity in social experiments see
Government Social Research Unit (2003). These include mobility post allocation to the treatment or control
group, contamination of the control group or Hawthorne effects where participants and/or implementers
behave differently as they know they are in an experiment.
42 Although the per recipient administration costs may fall under economies of scale.
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participation in post-compulsory education. Following positive evaluations of
experimental pilot schemes which started in 1999 (Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne and
Meghir, 2009), the policy was extended to the whole of the UK43 in 2004. Using
comparable dataset and methods, we compare the pilot and national roll-out estimates of
the effect of EMA on post-compulsory participation.
The EMA was introduced nationally in September 2004 to alleviate the relatively
low rate of post-compulsory education in the UK. As such, EMA is a conditional cash
transfer scheme, not unlike Progresa in Mexico for example, which provides 16 to 18
year olds staying in full-time education with up to £30 per week. The allowance is means
tested and can be claimed for up to two years of post-compulsory education44. Starting in
the academic year 1999/2000 EMA was piloted in 15 Local Education Authorities (LEA)
in England45 with an additional 41 LEAs joining the pilot scheme the following year46.
These pilot areas could be matched to similar local authorities (i.e. in terms of
demographics and educational attainment) to estimate the effect of the allowance. Using
this design, Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne and Meghir (2009) estimate an increase in post-
compulsory education of 4.5 percentage points in the piloted areas. Based on the initial
findings of the experiments, it was decided to keep the EMA in the pilot areas and expand
43 EMA Schemes were launched across England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in August 2004.
However the scope of this chapter is restricted to England as all the pilots were in England and because
there are certain (although sometimes slight) institutional differences in the education systems of the
constituent countries of the UK.
44 Most further education courses are two years in length but there is provision for EMA funding for a third
year in some circumstances.
45 Among these 15 original pilot areas there were variations in the payment levels of EMA.
46 Four of these LEAs used “Transport EMA’s” designed to fund students’ travel needs. These are
excluded from the analysis in this chapter.
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it to the rest of England for the academic year 2004/05. EMA now reaches more than
500,000 youths at a cost of £500 million per year.
The external validity of the results of the EMA pilot scheme potentially suffers
from some of the shortcomings highlighted above. The EMA pilot areas were not
nationally representative and had initially lower rates of participation in post-compulsory
education than the rest of the country (see Figure 3.1). Moreover, there was a five year
delay between the piloting and the national implementation of EMA which became less
generous in real terms. The nominal amount of maintenance has remained identical since
the original pilots in 1999 despite the retail price index increasing by 13% between 1999
and 2004. Similarly the household income eligibility thresholds were altered so that fewer
families could claim EMA but more became eligible for the full amount of maintenance.
Lastly the pilot study cannot capture general equilibrium effects that may occur once the
scheme is introduced on a wider scale. For example the post-compulsory education
system may experience capacity constraints when large numbers of students decide to
stay on in education. The incentive effects of the EMA may have effects on national
vocational training programmes and may cause changes in relative wages of school-
leavers and apprentices. Due to crowding out and signalling, the EMA may also affect the
education decisions on non-recipients.
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3.2 Policy Context
Participation in post-compulsory education increased substantially in England in the mid-
eighties from 50% of 16 year olds continuing in education to about 70% by 1992 but it
flattened at this level for the rest of the nineties (Figure 3.1) and growth thereafter was
slow. By international standards, post-compulsory education is thought to be low; the
percentage of 15-19 year olds in the UK engaged in full-time or part-time education is
69.7% which ranks third last amongst OECD countries and does not compare favourably
to the 81.5% OECD average (OECD, 2008). Moreover, there is a large gap in
participation by parental characteristics which has only narrowed slowly over time
(Blanden, Gregg and Machin, 2005). Identifying the mechanism causing this gap is
difficult. Family characteristics dominate short term financial constraints (Chevalier and
Lanot, 2002) but Dearden, McGranahan and Sianesi (2004) find that about 8% of pupils
face short term financial constraints and recommend that targeted policies be directed
towards students at the age of 16 rather than in later years.
In response to these problems and following positive evaluations of the pilot
schemes, the EMA was introduced throughout England (and indeed in the entire UK) in
time for the 2004/05 academic year. The scheme provides 16 to 18 year olds a weekly
cash allowance conditional on studying full-time. The allowance is means-tested on
143
parental income47 – but not the teenager income, so that part-time work while studying is
not discouraged. In England, the household income thresholds at which the allowance is
tapered have changed over time and for the academic year of 2010/2011 set at £20,817,
£25,521 and £30,810. The weekly payment levels to young people from families below
these thresholds are £30, £20, £10 respectively. The money is directly credited to the
pupil bank account and can be spent on any good. Additional bonus payments are also
available twice a year conditional on achieving personal educational targets, to improve
retention and attendance.
Before the national implementation of the scheme, EMA was piloted in about a
third of local authorities in England starting with 15 LEAs volunteering in 1999 and
another 41 joining the year after. Small differences existed in the implementation of the
pilots to test the policy parameters of interest. The variations in the scheme included
whether the young person or the mother received the EMA and whether the maximum
allowance was £40 or £30 per week. Compared to the national extension, the piloted
EMA had six to eight £5 bands rather than three £10 ones.
Note that there is a delay of 5 years between the evaluated pilot and the national
roll-out. Moreover, the parameters of the EMA have changed between the pilot and the
roll-out. EMA has become less generous, the maximum payment being £30 rather than
£40 in some of the pilots, moreover, this maximum has not been indexed to inflation,
47 The EMA is not calculated in the calculation of any other benefits the family may be eligible to.
Additionally, each family whose child aged 16-18 is in full-time education is eligible for child benefit while
low income family may also be able to claim child tax credit. So any EMA payment is fully captured by the
household.
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which over this period ran at 13%, so in real term the allowance is 13% less generous in
the roll-out than in the pilot. The eligibility thresholds have also been altered. The top
threshold has remained fixed in nominal terms, so that with inflation and a general
increase in the income distribution, fewer families are eligible for EMA. However, more
youth qualify for the maximum allowance since the lower threshold has been pushed up
from £13,000 in 1999 to £19,630 in 2004. Figure 3.4 summarises the impact that the new
parameters have had on the proportion of youth eligible.
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3.3 Literature Review
There is currently a vociferous debate regarding the methodology of empirical
microeconomics. Much of the debate is in the context of development economics,
however the arguments are, for the most part, not specific to that area.
One group of researchers (e.g. Imbens (2010), Angrist and Pischke (2010)) advocate
an experimental approach to policy evaluation as the only means to achieving internal
validity. However another group (e.g. Heckman (2010), Deaton (2010), Rodrik (2008),
Ravallion, (2009)) have concerns that the experimental approach only identifies effects
but does explain the mechanisms driving these effects and hence represents an atheoretic
“black-box” approach to science. A consequence of this is that experimental studies may
have low external validity. Another concern is that an over-reliance on experimental
studies is resulting in the neglect of areas where experiments cannot be easily
constructed.
Some researchers such as Heckman and Smith (1995) have concerns that the
experiments themselves do not provide answers to questions that policy makers have –
they only provide mean effects rather than the proportion of people who gained and lost
as a result of the introduction of a policy. They also have issues with the actual practical
implementation of experiments. For example, members of control groups may attempt to
obtain the treatment or find some substitute elsewhere.
The aim of this paper is to look at one area relevant to the current debate: whether the
effects of a pilot scheme, estimated using quasi-experimental or experimental methods,
still hold once the scheme has been “rolled out” or “scaled up” on a wider or perhaps
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even a national basis. Moffitt (2006) presents a taxonomy of “scale-up” effects. Firstly,
information diffusion effects may cause changes in the characteristics and the numbers of
people applying for or being affected by a policy. Secondly, the nature of the policy may
change from the pilot stage to an expanded stage. The nature of the treatment may alter as
administrators learn from past experience or with increased political interference. Lastly
there may be general equilibrium effects. The policy may alter market prices. Heckman,
Lochner and Taber (1998) simulate the effects of a tuition subsidy in a general
equilibrium setting where the enrolment effects of such a policy cause skill prices (high
school educated workers versus university educated workers) to change and where the
funding of such a subsidy through taxation is taken into account. In their study, the
effects of a policy are smaller once the general equilibrium effects are taken into account.
Duflo (2004) whilst advocating a quasi-experimental or preferably an
experimental approach to policy making, recognises that the scaling up or rolling out of
pilot schemes may involve many of the problems mentioned by Moffitt (2006). However
she points out certain strategies available to program designers that may improve the
likelihood that the effect of the policy at the pilot stage will be similar when implemented
on a wider basis. For example, the pilot scheme should be implemented in several
different settings. In the case of the EMA, the pilots were run (and matched with controls
areas) in inner city urban LEAs, mixed urban-rural LEAs and in predominantly rural
LEAs. Different variations of the pilot scheme should be run to identify which aspect of
the scheme is having a larger effect than others. She argues that although running pilot
schemes in different locations and running pilots with variations in treatment might be
147
expensive, it would be cheaper in the long run than running an ineffective policy
nationally.
EMA is an example of a “conditional cash transfer” policy which provides a
payment to certain groups of people contingent on their family income and contingent on
certain behaviours being followed. Similar schemes operating in developing countries
(e.g. Mexico, Brazil and Columbia) have received much attention in recent years (see
Rawlings and Rubio (2005) for a review). These schemes target extremely poor families
and the payments are made subject to the families investing in the human capital, both
educational and health, of their children. Such schemes are rare in developed countries,
however a recent exception is New York’s “Opportunity NYC – Family Rewards”
program which rewarded low income families for engaging in activities related to child
education and family health. Initial findings from Riccio, Dechausay, Greenberg, Miller,
Rucks & Verma (2010) suggest that there some positive effects on academic credit
accumulation and school attendance for certain subgroups
The Australian AUSTUDY scheme is the policy most similar to EMA. At around
the time the scheme was launched, Australia was ranked relatively lowly amongst OECD
countries in terms of participation in upper secondary education. Its ranking was usually
very close to that of the UK’s depending on the measure used. AUSTUDY was launched
in 1987 and covered the final two years of high school (as well as higher education). Like
EMA, the payment was made to the child rather than the parent (although an EMA
variant where the payment was made to the mother was piloted). All payments were
means tested on parental income. Dearden and Heath (1996) found that AUSTUDY
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increased post-compulsory schooling by 3-4% amongst poorer students and they
recommended that the UK adopt a similar policy.
Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne and Meghir (2009) conducted the evaluation of the
EMA pilot schemes by matching individuals in nine of the original treated areas with
individuals in specific control LEAs, and estimated that the EMA increased participation
by 4.5 percentage points for the eligible young people. Chowdry, Crawford and
Emmerson (2008), also estimated the effect of the pilot EMA but using administrative
data. This has the advantage of a much larger sample size but has the disadvantage of a
very limited set of covariates which leads to a noisy measure of EMA eligibility. They
found that EMA increased participation by between 5.5 to 7.3 percentage points for
women and by between 2 and 5.5 percentage points for men (although some of the
estimates were not significant for men) and an average treatment effect on the treated
ranging from 0 to 3%. Chowdry, Crawford and Emmerson (2008) also highlight the
heterogeneity of these results as the impact of EMA on participation is more than twice as
large in the most deprived quintile than in the least deprived one.
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3.4 Identification Method and Data
To estimate the effect of the pilot scheme on eligible students we estimate the following
triple-difference model:
0 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 1ijt i k k t ijt i j i t j t i j t ijt
k
Y a b E b LEA b T b X c E A c E T c A T d E A T           (1)
For an individual i, living in LEA j, at period t, Yijt is a dummy variable indicating
whether the student is in full-time education in the spring of the academic year following
her last year of compulsory education. E denotes the student’ eligibility for EMA, T
whether the observation is for a period when the pilot was in place, and A whether the
LEA is conducting the EMA pilot or not. In this case the pilot areas are the “treatment
group” and the Rest of England is the “control group”. Neither area had EMA when T=0
but EMA had been introduced in LEA’s from area A=1 when T=1. X a vector of
personal individual characteristics and  a random term. This linear probability model is
estimated by OLS using standard errors clustered at LEA level and robust to
heteroskedasticity. The coefficient dj is an estimate of the effect of the EMA pilot scheme
on eligible students in the pilot areas, i.e. the average treatment effect on the treated
group. Similarly, we can estimate the effect of the national roll-out of the EMA on
eligible students. The estimated model is similar to (1) but A is now an indicator of being
in an LEA implementing the roll-out, i.e. did not implement the pilot, and T is an
indicator for the individuals being surveyed post 2004. dj is now the effect of the
introduction of the national programme on eligible people and the pilot areas are used as
controls.
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Figure 3.2 shows that initially there was a large gap in education attainment
between the pilot areas and the Rest of England48. The trends in the proportion of students
remaining in education in the mid-1990’s are similar for both the pilot areas and the rest
of the country. Then there is a sharp kink in the post compulsory participation levels in
the pilot areas at the time of the introduction of the pilot programme. This story is
consistent with existing estimates of the effect of the EMA. However following the
national introduction of the scheme, there does not appear to be a significant increase in
the proportion of students in the rest of the country staying on relative to the pilot areas
where the scheme was always in operation. Instead the series seem to be converging.
As we can see in Figure 3.2 from around 2004 the proportion of young people
staying on in full-time education rose in both the pilot areas and in the rest of England. In
the former, the proportion rose by about 8 percentage points from 2002 to 2007 and in the
latter, the proportion rose by about 6 percentage points. This is in spite of the EMA being
introduced into the rest of England in 2004 having been already in the pilot areas for
several years. What event could have happened which affected the pilot areas more than
the rest of England when one would have expected the rise in participation to be greater
in the rest of England than the pilot areas due to the EMA being rolled out? One possible
explanation could have been the rise in youth unemployment taking place in the UK
around the same time.
48 The oversized data points represent the points for which usable YCS are available.
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Figure 3.3 shows the rate of unemployment amongst 16-17 year olds over time in
the UK. There is a rise in this rate from 2004 onwards. As the pilot areas were, on
average, more economically deprived than the rest of England, it is plausible that this rise
would have been greater in the pilot areas. With unemployment rates high, full-time
education could be seen as a “safe haven” by those deciding on their options and hence
the overall rise in participation in full-time education.
More formally we test whether the trends pre-pilot where the same. For this we
rely on LEA level data on the proportions of 16 year olds in post-compulsory education.
This data is available from 1994 but changes in the geography of some LEAs over time
means that we rely on an unbalanced panel for this test49. We test whether pre-pilot
similar linear trends existed between pilot LEA’s and the rest of the country. Table 3.1
reports these OLS estimates. While there are differences in levels, the trends in post-
compulsory education are similar between the two regions. Thus, the rest of the country
could be used as a control for the pilot areas. The second part of Table 3.1, check for
trend differences between the pilot and the rest of the country between the introduction of
the pilot and the national roll-out. Again, we do not find any significant differences in
linear trends between regions. However it should be noted that this analysis excludes
London (both Inner and Outer) as it was not possible to disaggregate the LEAs within
London into those that had participated in the pilot and those that did not.
49 The results presented in Table 3.1 are not sensitive to the treatment of the LEAs whose definition
changed over time. Excluding them from the analysis, keeping only observations after 1997 do not alter the
conclusion of no significant difference in the trends between pilot and rest of the country.
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To evaluate the effects of the pilot scheme and the national implementation of the
EMA, we use a series of cross sections spanning the period of interest. The Youth Cohort
Study of England and Wales is a recurrent longitudinal survey of young people beginning
in the year after their last year of compulsory education. Since EMA was only piloted in
England, we only keep England residents. For each cohort there are usually three annual
sweeps of these surveys. For this study we only use the first sweep – the Spring after the
student completed compulsory education - as there is a high attrition which is non-
random and much greater amongst those who do not stay in full-time education.
Information on post-compulsory education, labour market activity and some background
demographics is collected.
To evaluate the effect of the pilot scheme we use YCS 9 and YCS 1150. Cohort 9
was surveyed in 1997/98 before EMA was implemented anywhere and constitute the pre-
treatment period. Cohort 11 was surveyed in 2001/02 when EMA was piloted in about a
third of the country. To estimate the effect of the national implementation of the EMA,
we use Cohort 11 and Cohort 13 (surveyed in 2006/07)51. In this case the control group is
those LEAs where EMA was first piloted and the treatment group is the rest of the
country.
50 Cohort 10 consists of those who could enter post compulsory education in the academic year 1999-2000.
This is not used in this study as the EMA was only piloted in 15 areas that academic year and our estimates
would rely on a very small sample.
51 Cohort 12 could enter post-compulsory education in 2003/2004 and would have perhaps made a better
pre-treatment group. However for Cohort 12, unlike Cohorts 11 & 13, questions relating to EMA were not
asked until the second sweep. Given an attrition rate of 30% from sweep 1 to sweep 2, the sample size falls
considerably, with those in education in sweep 1 proportionately less likely to drop from the sample.
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Table 3.2 shows descriptive statistics relating to the backgrounds of the cohorts in
question. This confirms Figure 3.2 and shows that EMA pilots LEAs are different from
the rest of the country. In comparison to youths from LEAs not in the original pilot,
youths in the pilot areas are more likely to live in households without one of their parents,
where parents may not be working and where parents are less educated. Maybe due to
this less favourable background youths in the original pilot areas are less likely to be in
education in the year following their last year of compulsory education and also less
likely to have scored well in the GCSE exams when compared to students from the rest of
England.
In our analysis will examine effect of the EMA on young people eligible for the
programme. The EMA eligibility rules are based on total family income. Unfortunately
there is no parental income information in the YCS and we use the following procedure
to determine EMA eligibility. First, EMA eligibility is assumed when no adult in the
household is working. Second, when at least one parent is working and present in the
household, a weekly labour income is estimated using the Labour Force Survey (LFS). In
those cases, each parent’s labour income is predicted by fitting that parent’s
characteristics (education, race, occupation, seniority at work and region of residence) to
regression results from separate male and female earnings regressions estimated using
contemporaneous LFS data. Families with self-employed parents are excluded from the
analysis as it is not possible to infer their income using this method as the LFS regression
is based on employees only. Table 3.2 shows how the final sample is arrived at.
For each cohort, youths are predicted to be eligible for EMA if their predicted
family income is less than the year’s threshold for claiming even the minimum amount of
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EMA. Table 3.4 shows how our prediction of eligibility performs. The first row shows
the proportion of young people predicted to be eligible for EMA in England for each
cohort of YCS broken down by the pilot status. For the pre-pilot cohort we assume that
the threshold of eligibility would have been those used in the pilot scheme but adjusted
for inflation. The proportion of eligible people falls over time. This may in part be due to
differences in the accuracy of our predictions across the different cohorts. However it
should be noted that the threshold for the pilots was £30,000 and the threshold for the
national scheme was £30810. Since the rise in the RPI over the period was 13%, the real
value of the threshold fell. The proportion of eligible young people is higher in the pilot
areas than the Rest of England as the pilot areas were chosen on the basis of having
relatively higher levels of deprivation.
Table 3.4 shows that in YCS 13 (2006/2007) roughly half of the young people in
YCS are predicted to be eligible for receipt of the EMA52. The proportion of students
actually claiming in Cohort 13 is about 45%. This is slightly higher than the 40% yielded
when one divides the number of recipients in 2007/2008 (546,47253) by the number of 16
and 17 year olds in England (roughly 1.3 million). The procedure for predicting
eligibility appears to perform reasonably well, but about 7% of teenagers are predicted to
be non-eligible but actually claiming EMA54.
52 Other calculations we have carried out using FRS data gives a slightly higher estimate of around 55-60%
of families with children being eligible.
53 http://www.lsc.go.uk/providers/statistics/learner/EMA_take_up.htm
54 Our estimates of the effect of EMA are somehow sensitive to how these people are coded (see result
section).
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There is also a small proportion of youths who are estimated to be eligible for
EMA and are studying full-time yet are claiming not to be in receipt of the EMA. This
could be caused by noise in the method of inferring eligibility, indeed a disproportionate
number of these non-recipients come from families with both parents working, or error in
reporting EMA status. This could also indicate that the take-up rate of EMA is not 100%,
either because young people are not aware of the subsidy or because the costs, financial
and not of applying are greater than the benefits, especially for youths only eligible to
collect £10 per week.
Table 3.4 also shows some other anomalies. Firstly, 6% of students in those areas
which were not original pilot areas are receiving the EMA in 2001, before it was
introduced nationally. This could be because some students moved to pilot areas after
completing their compulsory education or just indicate misreporting. Unfortunately we
cannot resolve this problem, as our LEA identifier only relates to the LEA of the school
where they spent their last year of compulsory schooling.
Table 3.5 replicates the descriptive statistics presented in Table 3.2 broken down
by whether the student is eligible for the EMA or not. There are large differences in the
characteristics of youth by eligibility status. EMA eligible youth are much less likely to
be living with their fathers. In Cohort 13 only half of eligible youth have working fathers
for non-eligible youth this proportion is above 90%. Their parents are also much less
educated and they are more likely to be from a non-white ethnic background. For eligible
youth we observe a large drop in the proportion of youth with less than 5 high grades
GCSE over time but they still lag far behind non-eligible young people. Among the
eligible youth, those from the pilot areas tend to have worse characteristics than those in
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the rest of England while the differences between areas are less marked for the non-
eligible youths. The characteristics of eligible young people have deteriorated over time
which can be partly explained by the fall, in real terms, in the income threshold to receive
EMA. Indeed, the last column shows the characteristics of eligible youths in Cohort 13
had the income threshold kept pace with inflation. In this case the eligible group in
Cohort 13 would not have been as disadvantaged.
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3.5 Results
We separately estimate the effect of the pilot scheme and the effect of the later
introduction of the EMA to the entire country using the same methodology and
equivalent datasets. Our estimates are of the average treatment effect on those eligible to
receive EMA. The estimate is thus the effect of the intention to treat as some eligible
individuals do not claim EMA. We do not differentiate between those eligible for £30,
£20 and £10 as our method of predicting eligibility is noisy55. According to our YCS
sample, around 80% of all EMA recipients receive the full £30.
3.5.1 Effect of the Pilot Scheme
One may ask how sensitive our results are to our method of inferring eligibility, as such
Table 3.6 report the estimates when different assumptions regarding eligibility are made
with eligibility being defined as described previously. For each different sample, we
report the estimates for all youths and also separately by gender. The outcome of interest
is whether the teenager is observed studying in full-time post-compulsory education. In
Column A, the estimates are imprecise and none are found to be significant.
As shown in Table 3.4, there is some inconsistencies between the predicted EMA
eligibility and the reporting of EMA receipt in the YCS. The remaining columns of Table
3.4 show the sensitivity of the results to the treatment of these inconsistencies. In Column
B we have recoded all EMA recipients as being eligible regardless of their prediction (i.e.
55 While our method for predicting EMA eligibility performs reasonably well, predicting the level of EMA
payment is very noisy. For those receiving £20 and £10 in YCS 13, 70% are mispredicted to receive £30.
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as eligible, as ineligible or undetermined due to missing information of parental
characteristics). The pilot scheme estimates become larger and more precisely estimated.
The pilot is estimated to have increased post-compulsory education by 10 percentage
points, with large gender differences. The estimate are 4 percentage points but
insignificant for boys but as large as 16 percentage points for girls.
Table 3A3 shows descriptive statistics for three groups of people. Those who
were in receipt of EMA but were predicted, under the imputation process, to be ineligible
numbered 474 observations. Members of this group are more likely to come from
families where the father is present, where the parents are working and where the parents
are better educated than those who had been predicted to be eligible for EMA as the
prediction procedure used these data to infer eligibility.
Table 3A3 also includes those who were in receipt of EMA but where eligibility
could not be imputed (1533 observations). Members of this group disproportionately
come from families where the father is self employed. This was to be expected as the
imputation procedure was only carried out for families with fathers who are employees.
However in other respects such as parental education and prior academic achievements
they are more similar to the eligible people than the ineligible people although they are
more advantaged than the latter.
In the last set of estimates presented in Table 3.6, we recode as missing any
recipients of EMA who have been predicted as ineligible. The estimates are halved
compared to those obtained when all recipients were recoded as eligible. The only
significant result that remains is for girls who are found to increase their participation by
10 percentage points.
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In our favourite model, where all recipients are recoded as eligible, the estimates
are larger than those of Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne and Meghir (2009) who found that
the full-time education participation rates increased on average by 4.5 percentage points.
It should be point that they use only 9 of the original pilot areas matched to 9 control
areas. The estimates are also larger, although not by as much, than the estimates of
Chowdry, Dearden and Emmerson (2008) who use administrative data to estimate the
effect of the pilot scheme in the pilot areas which joined in 1999 and 2000.
3.5.2 Implementation of National Scheme
Table 3.7 replicates the analysis for the national roll-out of EMA for the different samples
specified. In the first sample, the estimates are again found to be imprecise. Recoding all
recipients to eligible improves the precision dramatically and the roll-out is estimated to
have led to an 8 percentage point increase in participation. Again the effect is larger for
girls (10pp) than for boys (6pp). The effect for girls is statistically significant. Dropping
the ineligible claimants halved the estimates, which were no longer significant.
Finally, with our favourite samples, we assess the heterogeneity of the effect with
respect to the students’ academic ability. Academic ability may affect the impact of
EMA on the decisions of students to invest in post-compulsory schooling. One could
expect an inverted U-shape effect where students at the top and bottom of the distribution
do not revise their choice, and where the effect of EMA is the largest for marginal
students whose academic abilities make them indifferent between dropping out or staying
on. In Table 3.8, we report our results for two different specifications. We use a cut off of
five GCSE grade A*-C to split the sample as this is the usual requirement to carry on.
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We find that the positive effects of the pilot scheme are driven by higher achieving
students. We do not find statistically significant effects for the national-rolling out.
Over all samples, we find that the estimated effects of the roll-out are smaller than
those obtained from the pilot. However, the estimates are never significantly different
between the pilot and the roll-out, partly due to the lack of precisions of some of the
estimates.
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3.6 Discussion of Results
The evidence of the national implementation having an effect on participation appears
somewhat weaker than those suggested by the pilot scheme. Indeed, Figure 3.2 even
suggests no effect of the roll-out, while individual level analysis in our favourite sample,
shows that the effect is two percentage points lower in the roll-out compared to the pilot
(but not statistically significant).
There are several reasons that could explain these weaker effects. First, the
original pilot areas were disadvantaged local education authorities with lower rates of
young people staying in full-time education. These local authorities may have
experienced a different trend in participations. The differences-in-differences technique
allows for different initial levels between the treatment and control areas. However it
does assume that in the absence of the treatment, there would have been common trend
over time in the average outcome in the treatment and control areas. Perhaps this is an
unrealistic assumption and that differing trends over time would have applied to less
well-off areas and better-off areas due to other government policies.
Our estimates attempt to mitigate against this by relying on a differences-in-
differences-in-differences strategy which uses non-EMA eligible students from the pilot
areas and the rest of England who would be unlikely to be affected by government
interventions (i.e. they would have continued in full-time education regardless). Rather
than assuming common trends on average in the pilot areas and the rest of England, we
rely on common trends in the differential between eligible and non-eligible people in the
pilot areas and the rest of England.
162
In the period covered by our data, there were two major policy changes which
may have affected the incentives facing young people in their decision to continue in
education. These were the introduction of the minimum wage and changes in tax credits.
If these policies affected the proportions of young people entering post-16 education in
the pilot areas differently to the rest of England, our estimates may be biased.
The introduction of the minimum wage in the UK may have changed the
incentives facing young people in their decision to stay in education. The minimum wage,
if above the equilibrium wage, may have reduced the probability of a school-leaver
finding employment but increase wages conditional on employment, and thus negatively
impact on school enrolment. This would bias our results if the minimum wage had more
bite in the pilot than in the rest of the country. However Table 3.9 shows this not to be the
case so the introduction of the minimum wage is unlikely to have driven the estimate of
the EMA roll-out down.
Additionally there were significant changes in the tax credit system. Tax credits
are supplemental income received by lower income working families. Since young
people aged 16 or 17 are classified as children if they attend full-time education, the
incentives to stay in education have increased though time. Since the Pilot areas were
poorer to begin with, the changes tax credit system, may have had a disproportionate
effect on them. In 1999 the Working Family Tax Credit, replaced Family Credit. The
new system was more generous to existing recipients and broadened eligibility to less-
well off families further up the income distribution as there was a reduction in the rate at
which the credit was reduced as family income grew. There were later changes but these
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were more modest in comparison and would have had less effect on the incentives to
attend post-16 education56.
If there were a greater proportion of households in pilot areas than in the rest of
England who benefited from the changes in the tax credit system, this may be biasing our
estimate of the Pilot EMA effect upwards as we are confounding the effect of EMA with
that of the introduction of Working Family Tax Credit. For WFTC eligible families, a
child leaving education reduces household income with the loss of the EMA and the tax
credit assuming the child’s labour income would not have made up the lost amount.
These reasons could affect the validity of the common trends assumption between
pilot and rest of the country, needed to estimate difference in difference estimates. We
thus re-estimate the model with a reduced control group composed of the less wealthy
LEAs only. Our measure of the relative poverty of an LEA is the proportion of students
in the area who receive free school meals (FSM). FSMs are provided to the children of
parents who receive Income Support, income-based Jobseeker's Allowance, Working Tax
Credit, etc. Only 10% of students living in pilot LEAs, live in areas where less than 10%
of students are receiving Free School Meals. Wheres just under half of students in non-
Pilot LEAs live in areas where less than 10% of students receive Free School Meals. The
56 Children’s Tax Credit was introduced in 2001. In 2002 Child Tax Credit replaced various income related
payments for children including WFTC and Children’s Tax Credit. .
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LEAs involved in the pilot scheme were thus poorer and may have been affecting
differently by the other policies introduced concomitantly to EMA pilot and roll-out.
Table 3.10 shows the estimates of the effect of the pilot scheme and the national
extension in LEAs where more than 10% of students receive Free School Meals. Here we
see some evidence of the effect of the national extension on eligible youth. Estimates of
the effect of the pilot programme are similar as before but much more precisely
estimated.
Another approach to comparing the pilot areas with similar LEAs would be to
examine the outcomes in the LEAs used by Dearden et al (2009) as control areas.
Dearden et al (2009) use nine of the pilot areas which started the scheme in 1999 and nine
non-pilot areas. These nine control areas were selected on the basis of socio-economic
characteristics, etc. None of the nine non-pilot areas were in the 41 LEAs which became
pilot areas in 2000. Unfortunately because of the small number of LEAs used in their
analysis it is not possible to use the YCS data to estimate the Average Treatment Effect
on the Treated. However Figure 3.5 shows the average proportion of young people
remaining in education beyond the age of 16 in the pilot areas and non-pilot areas used by
Dearden et al (2009). Due to changes in the way in which official statistics are collected it
is not possible to examine the series before 1998. However in 1999 and 2000, the rate of
staying on in the pilot areas is higher than the non-pilot areas. This is consistent with the
results of Dearden et al (2009). However in the early 2000’s both areas experience similar
trends in young people staying in education. When the EMA scheme is introduced
nationally in 2004/2005, the non-pilot areas experience a sharp rise in the proportion of
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young people staying on in education. The pilot areas also experience a rise but not as
sharp as that for the non-pilot areas.
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3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we compare the effects of the pilot implementation of a policy and of its
national implementation, thus we assess the external validity of pilot estimates. This is an
important issue as piloting programmes before their national implementations has
become more common in public policy. However, while estimates from pilot
programmes are believed to have high internal validity due to the experimental or quasi-
experimental design, little work has been done on their external validity. There are
several reasons to believe that estimates from pilots and national implementations may
differ substantially, in which case the external validity of pilot estimates would be small
and the information that we would gain from running pilots is limited.
Our estimates suggest that the pilot scheme did have an effect on the targeted
group. Although we find some evidence of the national scheme having an effect, this
evidence is not as strong or robust to sensitivity checks than the evidence supporting the
pilot scheme. Perhaps this is because the national implementation is less generous in real
terms and targets a poorer group of young people who are less likely to stay in education
full-time. In order for pilot programmes to be informative about the effects on the general
population, policy makers should set thresholds and payment levels of pilots schemes at
amounts which could be realistically maintained fiscally were the programme expanded
to a much larger area.
Most of the significant effects found in this chapter relate to young females rather
than males. This is consistent with findings of other policies interventions in the
education sector where significant effects were only found for females (e.g. Angrist, Lang
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and Oreopoulus (2009). It is currently an open research question as to why females
respond better to interventions.
Overall, our results are also consistent with short-run credit constraints playing a
role in the decisions of young people and that targeting these people has an effect on their
educational outcomes.
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Figures for Chapter Three
Figure 3.1 Participation in Post-Compulsory Education by Age: England 1985-2007
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Figure 3.2 Participation in Post-Compulsory Education
Average proportion of 16 year-olds in education full-time
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Figure 3.3 Rate of Unemployment in UK for 16-17 year olds
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Figure 3.4 Distribution of Household Income and EMA Eligibility Criteria
Source: FRS 1999 and 2004
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Figure 3.5 Participation in Post-Compulsory Education
Average of proportion of 16 year-olds in education full-time
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Tables for Chapter Three
Table 3.1 Trends in Post-Compulsory Education Pre-Treatment. LEA Level Data
1994-1999 2000-2004
Treatment*trend 0.285
(0.358)
0.137
(0.301)
Treatment -9.737
(2.229)
3.561
(1.994)
Trend -0.710
(0.294)
0.448
(0.263)
Constant 75.670
(1.813)
64.328
(2.384)
R2 0.256 0.119
N 458 402
Source: DfES: http://www.dfes.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/SFR/s000734/index.shtml
Excludes London (Inner and Outer) LEAs as those areas could not be disaggregated. Change in the
geographies of LEAs means that the panel is unbalanced. Conclusions regarding the non-significance of the
treatment specific trend estimate are not sensitive to excluding the LEAs with changing geography, or
restricting the data to years with consistent geography.
Estimates are based on OLS regressions, weighted by population size of 16 year olds in 2006. Standard
errors are corrected for clustering at the LEA level
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Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Family Backgrounds and Characteristics of YCS Respondents
Original Pilots Rest of England
YCS 9 YCS 11 YCS 13 YCS 9 YCS 11 YCS 13
Father present: 71.86 69.54 67.96 79.81 79.03 73.87
Mother present: 88.28 90.65 92.51 91.71 93.18 94.2
Father working: 67.17 72.45 81.36 83.68 87.57 88.75
Mother working: 64.12 58.01 66.89 78.26 75.86 76.09
Father’s Highest Qualification:
Less than A level 72.01 66.14 69.16 64.68 53.93 60.33
A level 8.63 14.86 12.67 11.57 19.01 14.06
Degree 19.36 19.00 18.17 23.74 27.05 25.61
Mother’s Highest Qualification:
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Less than A level 76.38 69.07 69.36 69.5 57.06 62.15
A level 8.83 16.41 14.93 13.62 21.55 15.73
Degree 14.79 14.52 15.71 16.88 21.39 22.12
Racial Background:
White 78.47 79.53 78.81 92.09 92.45 92.68
Black 4.37 5.57 6.34 1.35 1.09 1.69
Asian 15.61 12.03 11.44 5.76 5.07 3.55
Mixed 1.54 2.86 3.41 0.8 1.39 2.08
Less than 5 A*-C grades at GCSE 56.88 57.08 42.68 47.06 41.7 35.25
Still in education Spring after final
compulsory year 69.19 70.43 71.04 73.29 74.85 74.99
N 1692 2123 1815 5156 5611 2812
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Table 3.3 Estimates of Eligibility for EMA
YCS 9 YCS 11 YCS 13
Total number of observations in English LEAs 13762 14894 7523
MINUS:
Missing information to infer paternal earnings for working fathers 3854 3606 1314
Missing information to infer maternal earnings for working mothers 828 534 453
Father self-employed** 1710 2126 595
Missing outcome variable or control variables or living in Transport
EMA* 30 263 255
Total number of observations for which eligibility/non-eligibility
inferred 6848 7734 4627
* these were LEAs where EMA was paid towards transport costs of students. As this is quite a different scheme, these areas were ignored.
**LFS only used to infer income for employees only
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Table 3.4 Estimates of Eligibility for EMA
ALL Original Pilots Rest of England
YCS 9 YCS 11 YCS 13 YCS 9 YCS 11 YCS 13 YCS 9 YCS 11 YCS 13
Predicted eligible for EMA 73.8 68.03 53.27 83.31 74.32 54.77 62.91 55.99 43.49
In receipt of EMA 0.00 20.47 44.66 0.00 50.12 49.54 0.00 5.77 38.80
“Not Eligible” for EMA but in
receipt of EMA. 0.00 1.4 7.01 0.00 3.72 5.95 0.00 0.50 7.8
“Eligible” for EMA, attending
school but not in receipt 0.00 30.47 0.94 0.00 0.25 0.93 0.00 35.29 0.94
N 6848 7734 4627 1692 2123 1815 5156 5611 2812
All expressed as a percentage of total number of student in corresponding year and treatment/control group
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Table 3.5 Background of YCS respondents by EMA eligibility
EMA eligible Not EMA eligible Inflation adjusted
Original Pilots Rest of England Original Pilots Rest of England All
YCS 9 YCS 11 YCS 13 YCS 9 YCS 11 YCS 13 YCS 9 YCS 11 YCS 13 YCS 9 YCS 11 YCS 13 YCS 13
Father present: 66.23 59.80 44.00 67.91 62.6 39.34 100.00 100 99.71 100 100 99.93 54.34
Mother present: 86.26 88.54 87.94 87.43 88.81 88.57 98.41 97.28 98.57 98.98 98.7 98.45 90.97
Father working: 59.15 60.36 50.94 72.36 75.08 52.59 100 100 100 100 100 100 71.45
Mother working: 56.77 47.3 43.06 66.48 62.9 50.29 99.09 91.42 96.1 97.41 91.85 94.16 60.22
Father’s Highest Qualification:
Less than A level 90.12 87.98 86.52 87.03 82.35 78.98 13.55 23.53 59.26 37.57 28.29 54.99 88.88
A level 3.86 6.54 8.53 6.28 10.55 13.83 24.03 30.9 15.03 17.99 26.63 14.13 7.24
Degree 6.02 5.48 4.95 6.68 7.10 7.20 62.43 45.57 25.71 44.44 45.09 30.88 3.89
Mother’s Highest Qualification:
Less than A level 87.84 84.22 77.01 84.5 77.77 68.38 32.57 29.66 60.62 48.69 34.09 57.99 78.38
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A level 6.11 8.67 13.63 8.88 12.95 14.29 19.2 36.75 16.42 20.18 31.13 16.70 10.67
Degree 6.05 7.11 9.35 6.61 9.28 17.33 48.23 33.59 22.97 31.12 34.78 25.32 10.95
Racial Background:
White 75.67 75.9 69.49 89.31 90.16 88.81 92.25 90.97 90.87 96.74 95.28 95.58 85.28
Black 4.76 6.56 8.6 1.88 1.5 2.52 2.45 2.39 3.41 0.46 0.58 1.08 3.87
Asian 17.89 14.96 16.85 7.85 7.1 5.76 4.41 2.84 4.45 2.27 2.55 1.89 7.73
Mixed 1.68 2.59 5.07 0.95 1.24 2.9 0.88 3.8 1.27 0.53 1.59 1.46 3.12
Less than 5 A*-C
grades at GCSE 63.4 64.83 52.1 58.2 53.47 42.81 24.27 32.31 30.21 28.15 26.32 29.55 44.91
Still in education 65.81 67.55 66.97 66.37 68.97 72.4 86.12 81.47 76.43 85.02 82.96 76.94 70.22
N 1436 1631 1324 3405 3363 1494 256 492 491 1751 2248 1318 3416
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Table 3.6 Linear Probability Model– Effect of EMA Pilot Scheme on Post-Compulsory Full-Time Education of Eligible Youth
A- Predicted eligibility B- Recoding all recipients
to eligible
C- Recoding ineligible
recipients to missing
PILOT estimates Male
&
female
Male
only
Female
only
Male
&
female
Male
only
Female
only
Male
&
female
Male
only
Female
only
Average Treatment Effect on Treated 0.022 -0.019 0.065 0.103 0.04 0.163 0.055 0.002 0.107
Standard Error 0.038 0.064 0.046 0.041* 0.067 0.045** 0.04 0.067 0.045*
Sample Size 14612 6576 8036 15308 6857 8451 14503 6538 7965
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the LEA level.
+, * and ** indicate significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table 3.7 Linear Probability Model– Effect of EMA Roll-Out on Post-Compulsory Full-Time Education of Eligible Youth.
A- Predicted eligibility B- Recoding all recipients
to eligible
C- Recoding ineligible
recipients to missing
Roll-out estimates Male
&
female
Male
only
Female
only
Male
&
female
Male
only
Female
only
Male
&
female
Male
only
Female
only
Average Treatment Effect on Treated 0.034 0.048 0.018 0.083 0.062 0.100 0.046 0.033 0.055
Standard Error 0.041 0.066 0.055 0.044+ 0.070 0.048* 0.045 0.074 0.055
Sample Size 12361 5633 6728 13894 6329 7565 11927 5433 6494
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the LEA level.
+, * and ** indicate significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table 3.8 Linear Probability Model – Effect of EMA Pilot and Roll Out on Post-Compulsory Full Time Education by GCSE Achievement
A- Predicted eligibility B- Recoding all recipients to eligible
Students <5 A*-
C GCSE grades
Students +5 A*-
C GCSE grades
Students <5 A*-
C GCSE grades
Students +5 A*-C
GCSE grades
Male
only
Female
only
Male
only
Femal
e only
Male
only
Female
only
Male
only
Female
only
PILOT
Average Treatment Effect on Treated -0.2 0.076 0.061 0.08 -0.128 0.273 0.113 0.119
Standard Error 0.153 0.148 0.04 0.038* 0.158 0.148+ 0.043** 0.039**
Sample Size 2760 2854 4097 5597 2760 2854 4097 5597
ROLL OUT
Average Treatment Effect on Treated 0.052 -0.072 0.019 0.063 -0.034 0.165 0.076 0.057
Standard Error 0.127 0.157 0.05 0.049 0.143 0.162 0.052 0.046
Sample Size 2523 2560 3806 5005 2523 2560 3806 5005
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the LEA level. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
+, * and ** indicate significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table 3.9 Rates of Minimum Wage & Average Youth Wages
16-17 Year
Olds Minimum
Wage
Average Youth
Wages Non-
Pilots Areas
Standard Deviation
Youth Wages Non-Pilots Areas
Average Youth
Wages Pilots Areas
Standard Deviation
Youth Wages Pilots Areas
1998-1999 2.99 1.25 2.81 1.56
1999-2000 -
2000-2001 -
2001-2002 - 3.75 1.64 3.50 1.89
2002-2003 -
2003-2004 -
2004-2005 £3.00
2005-2006 £3.00
2006-2007 £3.30 4.80 1.03 4.77 1.29
2007-2008 £3.40
2008-2009 £3.53
2009-2010 £3.57
Source: http://www.lowpay.gov.uk/ and YCS 9, YCS 11 and YCS 13.
187
Table 3.10 Linear Probability Model – Effect of EMA Pilot Scheme on Post-Compulsory Full-Time Education of Eligible Youth in Areas Where More Than 10% of
Students Receive Free School Meals.
A- Predicted eligibility B- Recoding all recipients to eligible
Students <5 A*-C
GCSE grades
Students +5 A*-C
GCSE grades
Students <5 A*-C
GCSE grades
Students +5 A*-C
GCSE grades
Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females
PILOT
Average Treatment Effect on Treated -0.257 0.05 0.077 0.111 -0.192 0.236 0.127 0.147
Standard Error 0.16 0.158 0.043+ 0.041** 0.165 0.159 0.046** 0.042**
Sample Size 2119 2166 2816 3902 2231 2319 2969 4134
ROLL OUT
Average Treatment Effect on Treated 0.083 -0.164 0.028 0.118 -0.017 0.067 0.106 0.103
Standard Error 0.137 0.169 0.052 0.055* 0.155 0.176 0.056+ 0.052*
Sample Size 1704 1727 2315 3040 1977 2006 2643 3486
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the LEA level. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
+, * and ** indicate significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Appendix for Chapter Three
Table 3A1 Linear Probability Model– Effect of EMA Pilot Scheme on Post-Compulsory Full-Time Education of Eligible Youth
A- Predicted eligibility B- Recoding all recipients to eligible C- Recoding ineligible recipients to missing
All Males Females All Males Females All Males Females
Eligible -0.082 -0.097 -0.065 -0.084 -0.099 -0.068 -0.081 -0.097 -0.064
0.012 0.016 0.016 0.012 0.016 0.016 0.012 0.016 0.016
After Policy
Change -0.026 -0.042 -0.010 -0.028 -0.044 -0.011 -0.028 -0.044 -0.012
0.010 0.019 0.013 0.010 0.019 0.013 0.010 0.019 0.013
Eligible*After
Policy Change 0.033 0.065 0.001 0.045 0.074 0.015 0.035 0.066 0.003
0.016 0.025 0.020 0.016 0.025 0.020 0.016 0.025 0.020
LEA Where
Policy
Changed 0.010 -0.019 0.039 0.011 -0.018 0.039 0.010 -0.019 0.039
0.019 0.032 0.024 0.019 0.032 0.024 0.019 0.032 0.024
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Eligible* LEA
Where Policy
Changed 0.002 0.057 -0.052 0.002 0.056 -0.053 0.003 0.057 -0.051
0.028 0.042 0.033 0.028 0.042 0.033 0.028 0.042 0.033
After Policy
Change*LEA
Where Policy
Change -0.011 0.002 -0.025 -0.044 -0.019 -0.068 -0.043 -0.019 -0.067
0.033 0.054 0.040 0.037 0.059 0.041 0.037 0.059 0.041
Eligible*After
Policy
Change*LEA
Where Policy
Change 0.022 -0.020 0.066 0.103 0.040 0.163 0.055 0.002 0.107
0.038 0.064 0.046 0.041 0.067 0.045 0.040 0.067 0.045
Less than 5
A*-C GCSE
grades -0.358 -0.382 -0.334 -0.350 -0.376 -0.323 -0.360 -0.383 -0.337
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0.009 0.013 0.011 0.009 0.013 0.010 0.009 0.013 0.011
Male -0.036 0.000 0.000 -0.040 0.000 0.000 -0.035 0.000 0.000
0.008 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000
Sample Size 14612 6576 8036 15308 6857 8451 14503 6538 7965
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Table 3A2 Linear Probability Model – Effect of EMA Pilot and Roll Out on Post-Compulsory Full Time Education by GCSE Achievement
A- Predicted eligibility B- Recoding all recipients to eligible C- Recoding ineligible recipients to missing
All Males Females All Males Females All Males Females
Eligible -0.028 -0.004 -0.052 0.060 0.063 0.054 0.012 0.026 -0.005
0.024 0.046 0.027 0.026 0.046 0.022 0.027 0.048 0.024
After Policy
Change -0.061 -0.022 -0.101 -0.068 -0.056 -0.084 -0.070 -0.059 -0.083
0.032 0.052 0.039 0.039 0.060 0.041 0.039 0.060 0.041
Eligible*After
Policy Change 0.012 -0.022 0.045 0.017 0.030 0.009 0.019 0.013 0.027
0.036 0.060 0.047 0.039 0.064 0.041 0.041 0.067 0.047
LEA Where
Policy
Changed -0.001 0.011 -0.010 0.034 0.036 0.031 0.033 0.035 0.030
0.021 0.038 0.026 0.025 0.043 0.027 0.025 0.042 0.027
Eligible* LEA
Where Policy -0.024 -0.033 -0.016 -0.105 -0.096 -0.112 -0.059 -0.058 -0.058
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Changed
0.027 0.050 0.030 0.029 0.050 0.026 0.029 0.052 0.028
After Policy
Change*LEA
Where Policy
Change 0.013 -0.020 0.044 -0.001 -0.007 0.007 0.001 -0.005 0.008
0.035 0.056 0.044 0.042 0.064 0.046 0.042 0.064 0.046
Eligible*After
Policy
Change*LEA
Where Policy
Change 0.034 0.048 0.018 0.083 0.062 0.100 0.046 0.033 0.055
0.041 0.066 0.055 0.044 0.070 0.048 0.045 0.074 0.056
Less than 5
A*-C GCSE
grades -0.344 -0.367 -0.320 -0.328 -0.349 -0.306 -0.354 -0.378 -0.330
0.009 0.013 0.012 0.009 0.012 0.011 0.009 0.013 0.012
Male -0.033 0.000 0.000 -0.036 0.000 0.000 -0.034 0.000 0.000
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0.009 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000
Sample Size 12361 5633 6728 13894 6329 7565 11927 5433 6494
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Table 3A3 Descriptive Statistics of EMA recipients and imputed eligibility status
EMA recipient
but imputed to be ineligible
EMA recipient
but imputation could not be made
In receipt of EMA
and imputed to be eligible
Father present: 99.68 76.32 44.98
Mother present: 97.92 94.41 91.14
Father working: 100 87.68 47.5
Father self-employed 0 61.24 0
Mother working: 94.44 70.61 45.09
Father’s Highest Qualification:
Less than A level 64.2 70.77 86.3
A level 17.09 15.3 8.38
Degree 18.71 13.93 5.33
Mother’s Highest Qualification:
Less than A level 68.71 72.01 76.46
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A level 17.38 16.68 13.05
Degree 13.9 11.31 10.49
Racial Background:
White 94.89 80.79 77.27
Black 1.36 6.02 5.34
Asian 2.14 10.81 13.97
Mixed 1.61 2.38 3.42
Less than 5 A*-C grades at GCSE 38.41 46.43 48
Still in education 88.02 89.87 88.46
N 434 1533 2675
